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WITHHOLDING INJUNCTIONS IN COPYRIGHT CASES:
IMPACTS OF EBAY

PAMELA SAMUELSON*
ABSTRACT
Before the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., which ruled that courts should exercise equitable
discretion when considering whether to issue permanent injunctions
in patent infringement cases, courts routinely granted injunctions in
copyright cases when plaintiffs proved that defendants had infringed
or had likely infringed copyrights. Such findings triggered presumptions of irreparable harm, which were almost never rebutted. Only
rarely would courts consider a balancing of hardships or effects of
injunctions on public interests.
In the first several years after eBay, commentators reported that
eBay had had little impact on the availability of injunctive relief in
copyright cases. However, after a key Second Circuit ruling in 2010
concluded that eBay requires plaintiffs to prove all four factors and
that eBay had overturned presumptions of irreparable harm, courts
have dutifully followed the dictates of eBay and have more frequently
denied injunctions in four types of cases: (1) when copyright owners
failed to offer persuasive evidence of irreparable harm and/or
inadequacy of legal remedies, (2) when a balance of hardships
favored defendants, (3) when public interests would be better served
by denying the requested injunctions, and (4) when the plaintiff was
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Leval, Glynn Lunney, Doug Rendleman, Caprice Roberts, Matt Sag, Michal Shur Ofri, Jessica
Silbey, Xiying Tang, Rebecca Tushnet, Jacob Victor, and Christopher Yoo for comments on
earlier versions of this Article.
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seeking to vindicate non-copyright interests. While injunctions are
still quite common in simple piracy cases, eBay has radically
changed the injunctive relief calculus for copyright plaintiffs.
Although numerous private law scholars have criticized eBay for
its departures from traditional principles of equity, this Article
explains why the post-eBay copyright rulings comport with those
principles. It concludes that the eBay four-factor test has had, by
and large, salutary effects on the exercise of equitable discretion in
considering injunctions in copyright infringement cases. eBay notwithstanding, there are numerous reasons why courts in copyright
cases continue to be reluctant to grant damage-only awards. After
eBay, courts have eschewed categorical pro-injunction rules and
induced them to carefully tailor copyright infringement remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
ruling has had transformative effects on the availability of injunctive relief for intellectual property (IP) infringements.1 That decision
held that courts should deny injunctions in patent infringement
cases unless plaintiffs have shown that (1) without an injunction,
they would suffer irreparable harm; (2) compensatory remedies at
law would be inadequate; (3) a balance of hardships tips in their
favor; and (4) “the public interest would not be disserved by” the
issuance of an injunction.2 The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
1. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see Matthew Sag & Pamela Samuelson, The Hysteresis Thesis:
An Empirical Study of Copyright Injunctions After eBay 19 (Aug. 2, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3898460 [https://perma.cc/
3643-C9KM] (empirical study showing that courts have granted injunctions less frequently
in copyright cases post-eBay). As of August 31, 2021, the eBay decision had been cited 4,392
times in the subsequent case law, Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, (search
“547 U.S. 388” in search box; then select “citing references” hyperlink; then select “cases”
hyperlink), 3,163 of which matched the Westlaw key number for the four-factor test. Citing
References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, (search “547 U.S. 388” in search box; then select
“citing references” hyperlink; then select “cases” hyperlink; then select “filter” hyperlink; then
select “headnote topics” hyperlink; then select “patents” hyperlink). The most recent empirical
study on the impact of eBay in patent cases shows that courts deny permanent injunctions in
more than a quarter of the cases. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in
Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983 (2016). eBay
has also significantly affected injunctive relief in trademark cases. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley,
Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795, 1796-1800
(2017). This is likely to change because Congress amended trademark law to impose a
rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm in infringement cases. See Trademark
Modernization Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 226; see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, eBay,
Permanent Injunctions, and Trade Secrets, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553, 557 (2020) (reporting
that eBay has had a modest impact in trade secret cases). The impact of eBay has been
significant beyond IP cases. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The
Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 203, 214-16 (2012) (noting the impact of eBay beyond IP cases). See generally DAN B.
DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.11(2)
(3d ed. 2017).
2. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. The eBay decision misstated the first factor by saying that
plaintiffs must show that they “ha[ve] suffered” irreparable harm. Id. Remedies scholar
Douglas Laycock criticized eBay for this focus on past rather than future harm. DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:CASES AND MATERIALS 428 (4th ed. 2010). Later
Supreme Court decisions have clarified that injunctions are forward-looking, that is, they aim
to prevent future irreparable harm. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008). I have taken the liberty of restating the eBay test with the proper phrasing.
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“categorical rule” that injunctions should virtually always issue
upon a finding of infringement.3 In addition to pointing out that
both the patent and copyright statutes provide that courts “may”
issue injunctions,4 not that they must, the Court relied on three of
its copyright precedents for the proposition that injunctions need
not always be issued in IP cases.5 Note 10 of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. said that the public interest is not always served by
injunctive relief when defendants raise plausible fair use defenses.6
This Article assesses how the Campbell footnote and the eBay fourfactor test have affected the availability of injunctions as a remedy
for copyright infringement in the decades that followed.7
Part I shows that prior to the Campbell decision, courts routinely
issued permanent injunctions when plaintiffs had proven that
defendants infringed copyrights and preliminary injunctions when
plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits,8 although
courts sometimes denied injunctions because of unreasonable delay
or a plaintiff ’s unclean hands.9 Courts occasionally decided that
3. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94.
4. Id. at 392 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283); see also 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).
5. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392-93 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit
Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908)). These decisions are discussed infra Parts I.B, II.A, II.C.
6. 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
7. Some early articles concluded that eBay had had little impact on the availability of
injunctions in copyright infringement cases. See, e.g., Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After
eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 218 (2012); Jake Phillips, Note,
eBay’s Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Property Rules Give Way to Liability Rules, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 407 (2009). Liu’s study focused on the first four years of cases after
eBay, and Phillips’s study focused on the more immediate aftermath of eBay. Liu, supra, at
28; Phillips, supra, at 419. In the past decade, however, courts have taken the eBay decision
more seriously, especially after the Second and Ninth Circuits, which are the leading
copyright jurisdictions, ruled that eBay had changed the injunction rules in copyright cases.
See infra Part III.B-D; see also Sag & Samuelson, supra note 1, at 19 (showing statistically
significant lower injunction grant rates in past decade of copyright infringement cases).
8. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.06[A][2][a], [B][1][a] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2021). The Copyright Act of 1976 (1976
Act) authorizes the grant of “temporary and final” injunctions. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). This Article
conforms to the more widely used terms of “preliminary” and “permanent” injunctions.
9. Laches is an equitable defense that typically depends on a judge’s determination that
the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing suit which resulted in prejudice to the defendant
(for example, because of stale evidence or change of position). See, e.g., Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667-68 (2014); see also infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text for an example of unclean hands as a rationale for withholding injunctive relief
in a copyright case.
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unusual circumstances warranted denying injunctive relief, as when
harm was trivial,10 when the infringement was of small parts of
larger works,11 and when injunctive relief would be too difficult to
tailor or administer.12 Judges had mixed opinions about whether
withholding injunctive relief was appropriate in close but ultimately
unsuccessful fair use cases.13
Part II explains that the Court’s Campbell decision transformed
fair use jurisprudence by recognizing that parodies and other transformative uses of copyrighted works favored fair use defenses. Yet,
its endorsement of withholding injunctions in close fair use cases
was rarely followed. Several withholding injunctive relief cases in
the post-Campbell, pre-eBay period involved architectural works in
which the courts decided that the balance of hardships tipped
toward infringers or that the requested injunction would have
negative impacts on third parties (such as innocent tenants). In one
high-profile technology case, courts denied a requested preliminary
injunction because they viewed the dispute as more about the
parties’ contractual obligations than about copyright infringement.14
Part III suggests that courts took several years before they began
taking seriously that eBay had much, if any, relevance in deciding
whether to grant injunctions in copyright cases. Since 2010, courts
have more frequently denied injunctions in four types of cases:
(1) when copyright owners fail to offer persuasive evidence of irreparable harm and/or when courts perceive legal remedies to be
adequate, (2) when the balance of hardships favors defendants,
(3) when the public interest would be better served by denying the
requested injunctions, and (4) when the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
non-copyright interests. While injunctions are still quite common in
simple piracy cases, eBay has radically changed the injunctive relief
calculus for copyright plaintiffs in cases in which defendants had
plausible defenses.15 In the past decade, courts have generally been
10. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
11. See, e.g., Belushi v. Woodward, 598 F. Supp. 36, 37 (D.D.C. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir.
1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
13. See infra Part I.D.
14. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
15. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.06[A][3][a] (describing eBay as
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dutifully analyzing each of the eBay factors and seem to be granting
injunctions less frequently now than before eBay.16
Part IV.A considers how the post-eBay copyright rulings comport
with traditional principles of equity. Although private law and
remedies scholars have lodged several criticisms against eBay,17 this
Article concludes that the eBay four-factor test has had, by and
large, salutary effects on judicial decisions as to whether to issue
injunctions in copyright infringement cases. Part IV.B speculates
about why eBay has not caused courts to withhold injunctions more
frequently.
I. PRE-CAMPBELL CASE LAW ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, courts routinely granted injunctive relief when plaintiffs had either proven
copyright infringement or shown a likelihood of success on the
merits.18 Some courts went so far as to say that plaintiffs in such
cases were “entitled” to injunctive relief.19 These decisions were
consistent with the conception of copyright’s exclusive rights as
creating an entitlement to an exclusionary remedy (that is, an
injunction).20 In the pre-Campbell and pre-eBay periods, courts
effecting a “sea change” in copyright cases with respect to equitable discretion to issue
injunctions). The Goldstein treatise states that eBay “unsettled long-accepted standards for
copyright injunctions, both temporary and permanent.” 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.1.2.2 (3d ed. 2019). Yet, it relies upon Liu’s 2012 empirical study, supra note
7, as evidence that eBay has, in fact, had little impact on the grant of injunctions in copyright
infringement cases. Id. § 13.2.1.1. This Article’s analysis, as well as empirical data from Sag
& Samuelson, supra note 1, suggest that Liu’s conclusion was premature.
16. Sag & Samuelson, supra note 1, at 26-27 (showing a decline in grant rates for both
preliminary and permanent injunctions).
17. See, e.g., Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 211 (noting that eBay’s four factors “operate[ ] as a doctrinal straitjacket”).
18. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.06[A][2][a], [B][1][a]; Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE
L.J. 147, 159 (1998) (criticizing the “collapse[ ]” of the four-factor test for preliminary
injunctions into one focused only on the likelihood of success on merits).
19. See, e.g., Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994); Walt
Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin
Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 598-99, 601-06
(2008) (discussing this conception of exclusive rights).
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typically presumed that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury
based on a finding of infringement or a showing of a likelihood of
success on the merits.21 Only rarely were other factors, such as a
balance of hardships as between the plaintiff or defendant and the
public interest, taken into account.22 However, a long delay in seeking injunctive relief and insignificant harm sometimes influenced
courts to deny requested injunctions.23 In addition, courts sometimes
denied injunctions when the defendant had made significant investments in creating their works and the infringing element
constituted a relatively small part of a larger work.24 More mixed,
however, were judicial views about whether injunctive relief was
appropriate in close but ultimately unsuccessful fair use cases.25

21. Prior to eBay, courts in all circuits except the Fifth Circuit presumed irreparable harm
once plaintiffs showed likely or actual success on the merits. See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY
ON COPYRIGHT § 22:44 (2021). Indeed, courts commonly presumed irreparable harm once
plaintiffs presented a prima facie case of infringement. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
8, § 14.06[A][2][b]; Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955). But see Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 18, at 154-58 (noting that early American copyright cases were reluctant
to grant preliminary injunctions, and tracing the evolution of the presumption of irreparable
injury in the twentieth century); EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 515-18, 521-27
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879) (discussing temporary and permanent injunctions). Drone
said nothing about presuming irreparable harm upon a showing of likely or actual
infringement. See id. Some modern cases before eBay rejected the idea that defendants could
rebut the presumption of irreparable harm by showing sufficiency of compensatory relief. See,
e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1997). The Patry
treatise criticized Cadence on this point. 6 PATRY, supra, § 22:52 (“Contrary to Cadence and
Nimmer, denial of a preliminary injunction on the ground that damages can be calculated is
the precise reason preliminary injunction requests have been denied for over 400 years.”). But
see H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and
the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1200-01 (2008)
(asserting that Cadence is correct on this issue). The eBay decision has made courts more
receptive to compensatory remedies as an alternative to injunctive relief. See infra Part III.CD.
22. See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding balance of
hardships favored defendant), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Apple
Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying a preliminary
injunction because of hardship to defendant). For further discussion of Abend, see infra text
accompanying notes 45-60. Courts in equity in the nineteenth century sometimes considered
hardships to defendants. DRONE, supra note 21, at 524-25.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. See infra Part I.D.
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A. Unreasonable Delay and Triviality Defenses to Injunctive Relief
The most common basis for judicial denials of injunctive relief in
the pre-Campbell era was a plaintiff ’s unreasonable delay in
seeking relief.26 In Love v. Kwitny, for instance, the court denied
Love’s request for a permanent injunction, even though the court
was convinced that Kwitny had unlawfully copied eleven pages of
Love’s unpublished manuscript.27 Yet, because Love had failed to
seek a preliminary injunction during six years of litigation, the
court found his claim of imminent, irreparable injury unpersuasive.28 Commercial interest in Kwitny’s book had, moreover, waned
over time, so any future injury to Love from further sales of Kwitny’s book was too “trifling” to justify issuance of an injunction.29
Another case denying a motion for a preliminary injunction
because the infringement caused only trivial harm was Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Hobart Manufacturing Co.30 Consumers Union had wanted to stop Hobart from quoting from a Consumer
Reports (CR) review of its dishwashers in a bulletin to its sales
force.31 Hobart copied the passages to inform its distributors about
the positive parts of the CR review and to explain why Hobart
thought it should have gotten the top billing.32 Even if the Union
26. See, e.g., Bourne Co. v. Tower Recs., Inc., 976 F.2d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1992) (denying
preliminary injunction for use of song in videocassette trailer because of delay), aff’d sub
nom. Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995); Tr. Co. Bank v. Putnam Publ’g
Grp., No. CV8707393, 1988 WL 62755, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1988) (publisher knew for
years about the intended publication of the allegedly infringing work); see also 3 GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 15, § 13.1 n.4 (citing cases); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.06 [A][3][c][ii]
n.131 (citing cases); DRONE, supra note 21, at 504-06 (discussing unreasonable delay as reason
to deny injunctions). Courts also sometimes denied injunctive relief when convinced there was
a low risk of future infringement. See, e.g., Marisa Christina, Inc. v. Bernard Chaus, Inc., 808
F. Supp. 356, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding risk of future infringement was minimal because
plaintiff no longer sold infringing sweaters); Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Ltd., Inc., 662 F. Supp.
1347, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying permanent injunction against further infringement of
copyrights in fabric designs because of business arrangements between the litigants).
27. 772 F. Supp. 1367, 1370, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff ’d, 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir. 1992)
(mem.).
28. Id. at 1374.
29. Id. at 1375. In the post-eBay case law, trivial harm is likely to be compensable by
money damages.
30. 189 F. Supp. 275, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
31. Id. at 278.
32. Id.
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was correct that this copying infringed its copyright, the court
calculated that the maximum actual damage suffered from the
infringement was forty-eight dollars, which was too trivial to justify
an injunction.33 The court was also unpersuaded by the Union’s
theory of irreparable injury that Hobart’s use of this content in its
sales bulletins would undermine “the confidence of its subscribers
in its impartiality.”34 This was not a type of harm that copyright law
was designed to prevent.35
B. Substantial Investments in Non-Infringing Elements
In a few pre-Campbell cases, courts denied injunctions because
the defendants had made significant investments in producing new
works whose value principally lay in their non-infringing parts. An
early example is the Supreme Court’s 1908 decision in Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n.36 Dun charged that Lumbermen’s Credit Association (LCA) infringed copyright by copying numerous entries
from its directory of data about North American businesses in LCA’s
similar directory focused on lumber-related businesses.37 Because
LCA had expended considerable effort in obtaining data about
lumbering businesses independent of Dun’s directory, the Court
affirmed dismissal of Dun’s suit in equity which sought to enjoin

33. Id. The court did not say there was an adequate remedy at law, but perhaps this was
implied. See id. at 279.
34. Id. at 279. Consumers Union later succeeded with a similar claim. See Amana
Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (N.D. Iowa
1977) (granting preliminary injunction for quotes from a CR review). But see Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049-51 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing
preliminary injunction for quoting CR product review in broadcast ads about vacuum cleaner;
quoted parts held to be fair use).
35. But see Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 314 F. Supp.
697, 700 (D. Conn. 1970) (granting preliminary injunction against quoting from CR in an
advertisement, in part because of irreparable harm to Consumer Union’s reputation for
impartiality). In the post-eBay case law, courts have denied injunctions aimed at preventing
non-copyright harms, even those that are irreparable. See infra Part III.F.
36. 209 U.S. 20 (1908). The Supreme Court cited Dun in eBay in support of its ruling that
injunctions need not issue in copyright infringement cases. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006); see also DRONE, supra note 21, at 525-27 (discussing cases
in which courts denied injunctions when the infringing part was a small part of otherwise
non-infringing works).
37. Dun, 209 U.S. at 21.
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LCA’s directory.38 Although the Court accepted that LCA had copied
some elements from Dun’s directory, it agreed with the circuit
court’s conclusion that issuing an injunction would be “unconscionable” given the defendant’s considerable investment in gathering
and adding new information to its directory.39 Dun could, however,
seek damages for the infringement in a court of law.40
A more recent example is Belushi v. Woodward, which denied the
plaintiff ’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop
further distribution of copies of Bob Woodward’s book about John
Belushi that included a photograph of the actor in which Belushi’s
widow claimed copyright.41 Because a TRO would significantly disrupt the publisher’s marketing strategy, the balance of hardships
tipped to Woodward.42 While protecting copyrights is in the public
interest, the court noted that “there is a competing public interest
in this case: the promotion of free expression and robust debate.”43
It mattered that the photograph constituted a very small part of
Woodward’s book.44
In Abend v. MCA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit gave considerable
weight to significant investments MCA had made in creating a
valuable derivative work having many non-infringing elements.45
MCA made the classic film “Rear Window” in 1954 after acquiring
the right to make a movie based on a Cornell Woolrich short story.46
Woolrich died before the renewal right vested, so he could not fulfill
his contractual obligation to assign the renewal right to MCA.47
Woolrich bequeathed his property, including his copyrights, to
Columbia University.48 On behalf of the university, an executor
assigned the motion picture renewal right to Abend for 650 dollars
38. Id. at 23-24.
39. Id. A number of post-eBay cases have treated the small-infringement-of-a-larger-work
within the adequate remedy at law or balance of hardships factors. See infra Part III.C.1-2.
40. See Dun, 209 U.S. at 24.
41. 598 F. Supp. 36, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1984). The court doubted that Belushi had suffered
irreparable harm. Id. at 37.
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. 863 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990).
46. Id. at 1467.
47. Id. at 1472.
48. Id. at 1467.
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and 10 percent of any proceeds Abend could procure from exercising
that right.49
After MCA authorized television broadcasts of “Rear Window” in
the 1970s, Abend sued MCA for copyright infringement in New
York, a litigation that ended with a $25,000 settlement.50 In 1977,
the Second Circuit resolved a similar renewal rights dispute by
holding that equitable considerations favored allowing the author
of an authorized derivative work to continue to exploit it.51 Relying
on that precedent, MCA resumed authorizing public performances
of “Rear Window.”52 Abend challenged this as copyright infringement in a California district court.53 The trial judge agreed with the
Second Circuit’s decision and granted MCA’s motion for summary
judgment.54 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second
Circuit’s analysis and held that MCA’s acts infringed Abend’s
copyright, which the Supreme Court affirmed.55
The Ninth Circuit was, however, mindful of MCA’s concerns about
the hardships it would suffer if Abend obtained an injunction.56 The
court attributed the “tremendous success” of the movie to its many
non-infringing elements.57 Enjoining exhibition of that film “would
cause a great injustice” as it would not only “effectively foreclose
[MCA] from enjoying legitimate profits derived from exploitation of
the ‘new matter’ comprising the derivative work,” but would also
“cause public injury by denying the public the opportunity to view
a classic film for many years to come.”58 Monetary compensation for
MCA’s continued exploitation of the film would, the court opined,

49. Id. Woolrich died in 1968 before his renewal right vested, so the right vested in his
estate, free from his contractual commitment to convey the renewal copyright to the
defendants. Id.
50. Id. at 1467-68.
51. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[A] person who with
the consent of the author has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have made
contributions literary, musical and economic, as great as or greater than the original
author.”).
52. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1467-68.
53. Id. at 1468.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1473-79; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990).
56. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479.
57. Id. at 1478.
58. Id. at 1479.
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be an adequate remedy at law for Abend.59 Granting injunctive relief in this case would be contrary to copyright law’s dissemination
objectives and encourage rights holders to make “exorbitant” demands, such as Abend’s “demand for 50% of [MCA’s] future gross
proceeds.”60 In today’s parlance, Abend might be characterized as a
copyright troll.
C. Difficulty in Fashioning an Appropriate Remedy
Abend was not the first case in which the Ninth Circuit considered the possibility of a compensatory remedy for copyright infringement as an alternative to injunctive relief. Several years earlier, it
did so in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America.61
That decision reversed a trial court ruling that Sony was not liable
for contributory infringement for making and selling Betamax videotape recorders that it knew consumers would use to make unauthorized copies of their favorite television programs, including
movies that Universal had licensed for network television broadcasts.62 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Sony was indirectly liable
for these acts of infringement and disagreed with the lower court’s
ruling that consumers’ copying of programs for time-shifting
purposes was fair use.63
The Ninth Circuit’s Sony decision acknowledged that “[t]he relief
question is exceedingly complex” and suggested that “the difficulty
in fashioning relief may well have influenced the district court's
evaluation of the liability issue.”64 That difficulty should not,
“however, dissuade the federal courts from affording appropriate
relief to those whose rights have been infringed.”65 Ordinarily,
Universal would be entitled to a permanent injunction for such

59. Id. at 1479-80.
60. Abend, 495 U.S. at 228 (quoting from a Columbia Pictures amicus curiae brief). The
Supreme Court was less receptive to this concern than the Ninth Circuit, saying that such
arguments would be better addressed by Congress. Id. The Court perceived Abend to have an
incentive to negotiate so he could profit from further exploitation of the work. Id.
61. 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
62. Id. at 964, 969.
63. Id. at 974.
64. Id. at 976.
65. Id.
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infringements.66 However, the Ninth Circuit accepted that Sony
might be a case in which a damage award or a continuing royalty
might be a more suitable remedy given the substantial public injury
that would result from an injunction.67
Unlike the trial court, the Ninth Circuit in Sony did not address
Universal’s demand for a permanent injunction that would have forbidden Sony from selling further Betamax machines and required
it to recall machines already sold, or forced it to redesign these
machines to render them incapable of recording television programs.68 The trial court was reluctant to issue such an order, even
if home copying of television programs did infringe, given that
Universal had stipulated that it had suffered no actual harm from
Betamax copying and proffered only speculations about future
harms.69 That court recognized that such an injunction would affect
not only Sony, but also members of the public who might want to
make copies of programs as well as copyright owners who did not
object to time-shift copies.70 The court concluded that “[a]n injunction against the Betamax would be inefficient and unwise” because
“[i]ts enforcement would be nearly impossible and in any event
highly intrusive.”71 If the court ordered Sony to recall Betamax
machines, as Universal requested, “this order would be unenforceable without extensive inquiry into the activities of Betamax owners
in their homes.”72
The Ninth Circuit did not address the potential impacts of an
injunction on home copiers. However, it was unsympathetic to
concerns about the impact of a remedial order on Sony: “A defendant
has no right to expect a return on investment from activities which
violate the copyright laws. Once a determination has been made
that an infringement is involved, the continued profitability of
[Sony’s] businesses is of secondary concern.”73 By the barest of
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 463, 468 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
69. Id. at 468-69.
70. Id. at 468.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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majorities, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision
on the fair use issue, making a discussion of remedies unnecessary.74
D. Mixed Views About Injunctions in Close Fair Use Cases
Sony was not the only close fair use case in the pre-Campbell era
in which judges were disinclined to issue injunctive relief.75 In
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., the Second Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction that forbade publication of a
biography of Howard Hughes because Random House had a strong
fair use defense and could answer in damages if an eventual trial
resulted in a finding of infringement.76
Although the biography copied numerous elements from three
Look magazine articles about Hughes’s life, the Second Circuit
expressed doubts that the portions copied were “material and
substantial portion[s]” of the articles.77 It criticized the trial court
for taking an unduly narrow view of fair use as available only to
scholarly works of scientific or educational value and for giving too
much weight to Random House’s commercial motive in publishing
a book aimed at a popular audience.78 It added that the injunction
would deprive the public of “an opportunity to become acquainted
with the life of a person endowed with extraordinary talents who, by
exercising these talents, made substantial contributions in the fields
to which he chose to devote his unique abilities.”79 Moreover, the
court noted that Cowles Media, which sold its copyrights in the Look
articles to Rosemont, had done nothing with them in the dozen
years since the articles’ publication, and there was no indication
74. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). The
majority held that making time-shift copies of TV programs was fair use. See id. Because
Betamax machines had substantial non-infringing use, Sony was not contributorily liable. Id.
The dissenters agreed with the Ninth Circuit that time-shifting was unfair and that monetary
compensation might be an adequate remedy. See id. at 499-500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 491,
496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying preliminary injunction to stop broadcast of documentary that
included forty-one seconds to two minutes from Monster’s film as it was likely fair use).
76. 366 F.2d 303, 306, 311 (2d Cir. 1966).
77. Id. at 306.
78. Id. at 304, 306-07.
79. Id. at 309.
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that the defendant’s biography competed with or lessened the
articles’ value.80
A concurring opinion offered an additional reason to withhold
injunctive relief: Rosemont had come to equity with unclean
hands.81 The firm had been formed “principally for the purpose of
suppressing the biography of Hughes.”82 The concurrence observed
that “[i]t has never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict
the dissemination of information about persons in the public eye
even though those concerned may not welcome the resulting
publicity.”83 Moreover, “[i]t would be contrary to the public interest
to permit any man to buy up the copyright to anything written
about himself and to use his copyright ownership to restrain others
from publishing biographical material concerning him.”84 The
concurrence invoked “[t]he spirit of the First Amendment” to
admonish courts to construe copyright law to thwart “any attempted
interference with the public's right to be informed regarding matters
of general interest.”85 Indeed, no one should be able to assert
copyrights to suppress critical commentary, for the law “was
designed to protect interests of quite a different nature.”86
A turning point in the law of fair use, as well as on the availability of injunctive relief in copyright cases, transpired in New Era
Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co.,87 as various
judges within the Second Circuit considered another copyright claim
that, as in Rosemont, aimed to suppress publication of a critical
commentary.88 As the owner of copyrights in the writings of the
Church of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard, New Era sued Holt
80. Id. at 310-11.
81. Id. at 313 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
82. Id. at 311. Hughes granted Rosemont the exclusive right to publish Hughes’s story.
Id. at 312. Rosemont had attempted to squelch not only the Random House book, but other
books as well. Id. at 312-13.
83. Id. at 311.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. New Era I, 684 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying a temporary restraining order
on laches grounds). A second opinion addressed Holt’s fair use defense and New Era’s demand
for a permanent injunction. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co. New Era II, 695
F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, New Era III, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), rehearing en
banc denied, New Era IV, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989).
88. See New Era II, 695 F. Supp. at 1497.
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to stop it from distributing copies of Russell Miller’s highly critical
biography, Bare-Faced Messiah: The True Story of L. Ron Hubbard,
which quoted extensively from Hubbard’s published and unpublished writings.89 Judge Leval ruled that Holt had a viable fair use
defense for the quotations from Hubbard’s published works and for
some but not all of the quotations from his unpublished works (such
as diaries and letters).90 However, Judge Leval declined to issue a
permanent injunction largely because of the legitimate public
interest in getting access to this “interesting and valuable historical
study.”91
Judge Leval’s fair use analysis in New Era was noticeably
constrained by a Second Circuit precedent case, Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., that had overturned another of his rulings that upheld
a biographer’s fair use defense for quoting from its subject’s unpublished letters.92 The Second Circuit in Salinger agreed with
Judge Leval that the biographer’s research purpose favored his fair
use defense; however, it disagreed with his analysis of the other
three fair use factors.93
Invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,94 the Second Circuit panel in Salinger
noted that “the tenor of the Court's entire discussion of unpublished
works conveys the idea that such works normally enjoy complete
protection against copying any protected expression.”95 Although the
Court had not entirely ruled out the possibility that fair use could
be made of unpublished works, the Salinger decision opined that it
had “diminished [the] likelihood that copying will be fair use when
89. New Era produced a sixty-five-page table of quotations from the book and passages
from Hubbard’s writings, forty-three of which featured quotations from Hubbard’s
unpublished works. Id. at 1498.
90. Id. at 1497, 1527-28.
91. Id. at 1525-28 (discussing the rationale for denying injunctive relief).
92. 650 F. Supp. 413, 422, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). Judge
Newman wrote the Second Circuit’s Salinger opinion for himself and Judge Miner. A third
panel member died before the opinion issued. Newman and Miner later came to loggerheads
in New Era about the proper interpretation of fair use in unpublished work cases. See infra
text accompanying notes 132-35.
93. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97-99.
94. 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (holding that verbatim copying of three hundred words from
Gerald Ford’s unpublished memoir in news magazine was unfair).
95. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97. Unlike the yet-to-be-published Ford memoirs in Harper &
Row, the Salinger letters were available to the public in university libraries. See id. at 93.
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the copyrighted material is unpublished.”96 The court also concluded
that the biographer had taken too much from the letters.97 Because
the biography copied “virtually all of the most interesting passages
of the letters, including several highly expressive insights about
writing and literary criticism,”98 it was likely to undercut the
market for an authorized collection of Salinger’s letters.99 The
Second Circuit directed Judge Leval to enjoin publication of the
Salinger biography.100
In New Era II, New Era argued that the Harper & Row and
Salinger rulings meant that fair use defenses were never, or almost
never, available as to unpublished works; hence, the nature-of-thework factor was “virtually determinative” against Holt’s defense.101
Judge Leval conceded that the scope of fair use was narrower as to
unpublished works.102 To succeed with a fair use defense, he thought
a biographer needed to show that the quoted material was “reasonably necessary to the communication and demonstration of significant points being made about the subject and must have no
significant adverse effect on the market for the copyrighted work.”103
He worried that public figures such as Hubbard could otherwise use
copyright law “as an aggressive weapon to prevent the publication
of embarrassing revelations and to obstruct criticism.”104
This concern was especially pertinent in New Era II because
Miller’s thesis was that “Hubbard was dishonest, pretentious,
boastful, paranoid, cowardly, cruel, disloyal, aggressive, bizarre, and
finally even insane in his pseudoscientific fantasies and his obsessions.”105 Judge Leval noted that “[o]ften it is the words used by the
public figure (or the particular manner of expression) that are the
96. Id. at 97.
97. Id. at 98-99. Approximately 40 percent of the book consisted of quotations or
paraphrases from Salinger’s letters. Id.
98. Id. at 99.
99. Id. Because Salinger was a notoriously private person who did not want any biography
to be written in his lifetime and objected to every single quotation and paraphrase of his
words in the book at issue, it was highly unlikely that Salinger would have authorized
publication of a compilation of his letters.
100. Id. at 100.
101. 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1498, 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
102. Id. at 1503.
103. Id. at 1504.
104. Id. at 1502.
105. Id. at 1498 (footnote omitted).
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facts calling for comment.”106 To illustrate why Miller needed to
quote extensively from Hubbard’s works, Judge Leval’s New Era II
opinion quoted at length from Bare-Faced Messiah.107
Judge Leval thought that Miller had generally taken only
“insignificant fragment[s]” from Hubbard’s unpublished works.108
The only market harm that Judge Leval foresaw from publication
of these quotes was the prospect that some readers would lose
interest in buying Hubbard’s works after learning how “dishonest,
conniving, opportunistic and insane” Hubbard was.109 This was not
the kind of harm to markets that copyright law was designed to
protect.
Yet, because Miller had not justified all of his quotes from
Hubbard’s unpublished writings, Judge Leval concluded that the
book infringed New Era’s copyrights to some extent.110 He recognized that injunctions routinely issue in copyright cases involving
exact or near-exact copying because harm from infringement may
be difficult to measure and incentives to create would be eroded
unless infringements were enjoined.111 However, he perceived New
Era as a “drastically different” type of case, having “nothing in
common with such opportunistic free riding.”112 Because Miller had
mostly quoted Hubbard's writings “to substantiate the argument of
a laboriously researched, well-constructed biography,” Judge Leval
concluded that it was “a valuable commentary on a subject of public
importance.”113
According to Judge Leval, granting an injunction “would diminish
public knowledge. It would suppress an interesting, well-researched,
provocative study of a figure who, claiming both scientific and religious credentials, has wielded enormous influence over millions of
people.”114 Enjoining publication of a book when only small parts
infringed “implicates concerns of the First Amendment,” which

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1502.
Id. at 1508-20.
Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1524-25.
Id. at 1525.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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abhors prior restraints.115 This principle “is so powerful a force in
shaping so many areas of our law, it would be anomalous to
presume casually its appropriateness for all cases of copyright
infringement.”116 Money damages, he concluded, could suffice as a
remedy.117 Judge Leval perceived New Era, like Rosemont, to be
trying to suppress publication of an unauthorized biography, not
trying to protect the kinds of economic interests for which Congress
has made copyright protection available.118
As in Salinger, the Second Circuit in New Era III agreed with
Judge Leval that the purpose factor weighed in favor of Holt’s defense.119 But as in Salinger, the panel viewed the unpublished nature of many quotations as weighing heavily against fair use.120 In
its view, unpublished works “normally enjoy complete protection,”
adding that there is a “strong presumption” against the fairness of
appropriating expression from unpublished works.121 Because New
Era planned to authorize a Hubbard biography and to make his
unpublished works available to that biographer, the panel thought
the harm factor also cut against Holt’s fair use defense.122
The New Era III panel opined that courts should issue an
injunction whenever a defendant copied more than a minimal
amount of expression from unpublished works.123 It disagreed that
the public interest favored withholding injunctive relief or that a
conflict existed between copyright and the First Amendment that
would justify denying an injunction.124 Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of a permanent injunction
because of New Era’s unjustified delay in bringing the lawsuit.125
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1527.
118. Id. at 1527 n.14.
119. 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 584.
124. Id.
125. Id. By the time New Era sought a temporary restraining order, Holt had printed
12,000 copies of the book, 9,000 of which Holt had shipped to distributors. Id. at 577. Judge
Leval concluded that granting the TRO would “subject [Holt] to very great harm and loss that
would have been altogether avoidable if [New Era] had moved more promptly.” New Era I, 684
F. Supp. 808, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

794

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:773

A concurring opinion expressed considerable support for Judge
Leval’s fair use analysis as well as his reasoning about injunctive
relief.126 It identified four rationales for withholding a permanent
injunction in New Era: First, the economic purpose of issuing
injunctions would be ill-served when the use would not cause
demonstrable harm to the future market value of the works being
quoted.127 Second, there is a public interest in the availability of
critical biographies of public figures.128 Third, awarding money
damages was a better way to balance the copyright and First
Amendment interests at stake in cases such as New Era.129 Fourth,
New Era’s delay in bringing the lawsuit was a significant factor
weighing against the grant of an injunction.130
The Second Circuit denied Holt’s petition for a rehearing en
banc.131 Judge Newman wrote a strong dissent criticizing the New
Era III panel decision for taking an unduly narrow view of fair use
as applied to unpublished works, saying that the decision “risks
deterring [authors and publishers] from entirely lawful writings in
the fields of scholarly research, biography, and journalism.”132 He
argued that copying unpublished expression should be lawful when
necessary to report facts accurately.133 He contended that neither
the fair use nor the injunctive relief analyses in New Era III should
represent the Second Circuit’s positions.134 Judge Miner, who authored the New Era III decision, wrote a short defense of the rehearing denial and of the views expressed in the panel’s decision.135
Perhaps because of the deep split among the Second Circuit judges
in New Era, Holt petitioned the Supreme Court to review the fair
use ruling, but the Court declined to review it.136

126. New Era III, 873 F.2d at 591-98 (Oakes, C.J., concurring).
127. Id. at 596-97.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. New Era IV, 884 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1989).
132. Id. at 662 (Newman, J., dissenting). Three judges joined Newman’s dissent. Id.
133. Id. at 663-64.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 660-62 (Miner, J., concurring).
136. Henry Holt & Co. v. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990) (denying
certiorari).

2022]

WITHHOLDING INJUNCTIONS IN COPYRIGHT CASES

795

E. Aftermath of the New Era Decision
A year after New Era IV, yet another unpublished-work fair use
case reached the Second Circuit in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.137
Richard Wright’s widow sued the publisher of a biography of Wright
because the book included several quotes and close paraphrases
from the novelist’s journal and letters.138 The district court granted
the publisher’s motion for summary judgment, finding that all four
fair use factors weighed in its favor.139
A Second Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s ruling, although criticizing it for giving insufficient weight to the unpublished
nature of the quotations and paraphrases.140 The appellate court
may have been influenced by amicus curiae briefs filed in support
of Warner’s fair use defense by the Association of American
Publishers, PEN American Center, the Authors Guild, and several
scholarly societies.141
Not content with the relatively narrow fair use victory in Wright,
representatives of publisher, author, and scholarly organizations
lobbied Congress for an amendment to the fair use provision that
would repudiate New Era’s “strong presumption” against fair use in
cases involving unpublished works. The Salinger and New Era decisions were, they said, having chilling effects on their work and
impeding fulfillment of the constitutional purpose of copyright
law.142 Shortly thereafter, Congress amended the 1976 Act by adding a sentence to the end of the fair use provision143: “The fact that

137. 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
138. Id. at 734.
139. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 953 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1991). As in Salinger, the unpublished materials were available to the public in a
university library collection. Id. at 110.
140. Wright, 953 F.2d at 737-38. One judge would have given less weight to the unpublished nature of the excerpts from Wright’s writings. Id. at 743 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 733 (list of attorneys and law firms).
142. H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 4-6 (1992) (explaining concerns about the Salinger and New
Era decisions).
143. Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992). The
legislative history of this provision is discussed in Daniel E. Wanat, Fair Use and the 1992
Amendment to Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act: Its History and an Analysis of Its Effect,
1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 47 (1994).
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a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all of the above factors.”144
Another consequence in the aftermath of the New Era controversy
was the publication of four law review articles by judges who
participated in the New Era case.145 The most influential of these
articles was Judge Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard, which
argued that “transformative” uses of other authors’ works should
weigh in favor of fair use because such works foster ongoing
creativity and enrich society.146 Four years later, the Supreme Court
heartily embraced Judge Leval’s conception of transformative fair
uses in its Campbell decision.147
One section of Judge Leval’s article focused on the “unfortunate
tendencies” in copyright infringement cases to decide that a “rejection of a fair use defense necessarily implicates the grant of an
injunction.”148 This was unfortunate not only for defendants whose
contributions to knowledge were being suppressed, but also for the
public, which would be denied the new knowledge the suppressed
work would have revealed.149 Plaintiffs too might suffer because
judges may be more inclined to find fair use in close cases to avoid
issuing an injunction.150
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
145. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); Jon
O. Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 12 (1989); James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use
and Injunctions, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 63 (1990). All three articles supported broader
fair use for unpublished works and withholding injunctions in close fair use cases. But see
Roger J. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA
1 (1989) (defending the New Era III decision).
146. Leval, supra note 145, at 1111-12; see also Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The
Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 167, 179 (1989)
(“If an injunction would impoverish society, and the copyright owner can be appropriately
protected by money damages, an injunction should not be granted.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s
Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990); Wanat, supra note
143, at 48 n.7 (citing articles).
147. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra
note 145, at 1111). The Court cited approvingly to Judge Leval’s article or fair use decisions
more than a dozen times in Campbell. Id. at 576-79.
148. Leval, supra note 145, at 1130-31.
149. Id. at 1131.
150. Id. Judge Leval thought this might explain his fair use ruling in Salinger. Id. at 1131
n.114. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659
F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the difficulty of fashioning a remedy
may influence a trial court’s fair use decision.
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Judge Leval accepted that courts should presume irreparable
injury in cases involving “simple piracy,” which was typical in the
“vast majority” of copyright cases.151 Defendants who parasitically
copy other authors’ works and sell cheap copies undermine copyright owners’ markets; courts should consequently enjoin these acts
to preserve authorial incentives to create and disseminate copyrighted works.152 However, close fair use cases were “worlds apart”
from piratical copying.153 Courts should recognize that historians
and journalists, among others, need to quote from others’ writings
in order to produce effective commentary about them.154 These
authors may not be absolutely certain they have remained within
fair use boundaries. When putative fair users inadvertently overstep these bounds, Leval suggested that courts carefully assess the
need for injunctive relief because there may be a “strong public
interest” in publication of their works.155 The statute, after all, says
that courts “may” issue injunctions, not that they must.156
Judge Leval’s article cited numerous commentaries urging courts
to exercise discretion in issuing injunctions because sometimes
money damages will adequately compensate copyright owners for
uses beyond the bounds of fair use.157 The article concluded that
injunctions should issue in close fair use cases only if necessary to
preserve copyright incentives.158 Decisions about injunctive relief,
like those about fair use, should be consistent with the “utilitarian,
public-enriching objectives of copyright.”159
151. Leval, supra note 145, at 1132. Judge Leval reported having decided between 150 and
200 copyright cases, all but about ten of which were, in his view, simple piracy cases. Id. at
1134 n.123.
152. Id. at 1132.
153. Id.
154. Id. Judge Leval reported self-censoring his Harvard article because of Salinger. An
earlier draft quoted numerous passages from Bare-Faced Messiah to show that the best way
to prove that Hubbard was a liar was by quoting from his writings. Reproducing those
passages, even in a law review article, could have subjected him and Harvard Law Review to
copyright liability under the standard set forth in the Salinger and New Era decisions. Id. at
1113 n.39.
155. Id. at 1132.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 502.
157. Leval, supra note 145, at 1131 n.112.
158. Id. at 1134.
159. Id. at 1135. In the article, Judge Leval “deliberately refrained from invoking the
support of the first amendment’s opposition to prior restraints,” not because this consideration
was irrelevant, but because this was “unnecessary and risk[ed] importing confusion” into the
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM
CAMPBELL TO EBAY
The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. is justly famous for its profound influence on the evolution of
substantive fair use law, due in no small part to its endorsement of
the transformative character of a challenged use as favoring fair
use.160 Campbell heartily embraced Judge Leval’s conception of fair
use, quoting numerous passages from his article when explaining
how and why transformativeness matters in fair use cases, not just
with respect to the purpose and character of the use, but also in
relation to the other factors.161 Yet, Campbell also notably quoted
from Judge Leval’s article about the possibility that the public
interest may be disserved by grants of injunctions in close fair use
cases.162
Section A reviews the Campbell decision and its note 10. One
might have expected the Court’s endorsement of withholding
injunctions in close fair use cases to have considerable influence in
the subsequent case law, but as Section B shows, the impact of this
endorsement in the pre-eBay fair use case law was quite modest.
Section C reviews several post-Campbell, pre-eBay cases in which
judges denied injunctive relief in other types of infringement cases
because of public interests and the likely impact of injunctions on
third parties and/or hardships on defendants. Section D considers
a high-profile case in which an appellate court overturned an injunction because it viewed copyright infringement claims as premised on breach of a license.
As one might expect, courts in the post-Campbell, pre-eBay period
denied injunctive relief for the same conventional reasons as were
analysis. Id.
160. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). For a discussion of the influence of Campbell on fair use law,
see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 818-24
(2015), identifying key contributions of Campbell beyond its endorsement of transformative
purposes. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed Campbell’s endorsement of
transformative purposes in fair use cases in Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183,
1202-04 (2021) (finding reuse of Java declarations in smartphone software transformative
because of creativity this reuse enabled).
161. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-91.
162. Id. at 578 n.10.
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common in the pre-Campbell era, including laches or unreasonable
delay,163 a low risk of future infringement,164 and occasionally, the
sufficiency of a damage award.165
A. The Campbell Decision and Its Note 10
In Campbell, the Court reversed a Sixth Circuit ruling that 2 Live
Crew’s rap parody of “Pretty Woman” had made an unfair use of
Roy Orbison’s song.166 The Sixth Circuit decided that none of the fair
use factors weighed in favor of Campbell’s fair use defense.167
Because Campbell’s use of Orbison’s song had a commercial purpose, the court presumed the use was unfair and presumed that this
commercial use would irreparably harm the market for Orbison’s
work.168 It invoked the Supreme Court’s Sony and Harper & Row
decisions as supporting these presumptions.169 Moreover, Campbell

163. See, e.g., Clonus Assocs. v. DreamWorks, LLC, 417 F. Supp. 2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding allegedly infringing movie had already been widely disseminated, so harm had
already occurred); Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Ent. Co., 98 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1996) (“An
unreasonable delay suggests that the plaintiff may have acquiesced in the infringing activity,
or that any harm suffered by the plaintiff is not so severe as to be ‘irreparable.’”).
164. See, e.g., Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding agreement between the parties made future infringement unlikely); Boisson
v. Banian Ltd., 280 F. Supp. 2d 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying permanent injunction in light of
defendant’s cooperation in ceasing sales of infringing products).
165. See, e.g., Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 608 n.11 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding injunction inappropriate as damages would suffice (citing Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 578 n.10)); see also Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8: “where great public injury would be worked by
an injunction ... the courts could ... award damages or a continuing royalty instead of an
injunction”).
166. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
167. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510
U.S. 569 (1994). One judge dissented. Id. at 1439-46 (Nelson, J., dissenting). As Judge Leval
has noted, many leading fair use cases have involved multiple reversals and split decisions,
including Sony, Harper & Row, and the 4-4 split in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
420 U.S. 376 (1975). Leval, supra note 145, at 1106-07 nn.9-10.
168. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1437-39. The Sixth Circuit accepted the trial court’s finding
that the 2 Live Crew song was a parody, even though it did not perceive Campbell’s song as
a parody. Id. at 1435 n.8.
169. Id. at 1436-37 (citing and quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562,
568 (1985)).
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had copied the “heart” of a creative work, which also disfavored
Campbell’s fair use defense.170
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit on virtually
every point. The purpose and character of a challenged use should,
the Court ruled, be primarily focused on whether the defendant has
“add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message;
it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’”171 Copyright’s overall goal, “to promote science and
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works,” which “lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee
of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”172 The Court
observed that “the more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.”173 It regarded transformative
uses as posing less risk of supplanting demand for the original;
hence, it was inappropriate to presume unfairness from this kind of
commercial use.174 Parodies were transformative critical commentaries whose purpose will generally favor fair use.175
Campbell renounced “bright-line rules” in fair use cases, saying
that there must always be a case-by-case assessment about whether
a challenged use was fair or unfair.176 In addition, courts should not
treat each factor in isolation, and no one factor should be dispositive.177 All factors must be considered and should be weighed in
light of each other.178 Moreover, according to Campbell, if a use is
transformative, courts should consider whether the amount taken
was reasonable in light of the user’s purpose.179 Courts should not
presume market harm in transformative use cases, but should
170. Id. at 1437-38.
171. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 145, at 1111).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 579, 584-85.
175. Id. at 579-82. The Court concluded that Campbell’s song “reasonably could be
perceived” as a parody. Id. at 583.
176. Id. at 577.
177. Id. at 578.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 588-89. The Court recognized that to be effective, parodies must copy enough
to “conjure up” the original. Id. at 588.
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conclude this factor disfavors fair use only when there is a substantial likelihood that the challenged work would supplant demand for
the original.180
Campbell’s fair use analysis has been very influential in the
subsequent case law.181 By embracing Judge Leval’s conception of
fair use as an important limit on copyright law that provides
breathing room for new creations, and by abjuring presumptions
about unfairness and market harm in commercial-use cases, the
Campbell decision has emboldened follow-on creators to engage in
many types of transformative uses.182
For purposes of this Article, Campbell is mainly of interest because of its endorsement of judicial discretion to withhold injunctions in close fair use cases.183 Here is note 10 in full:
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of
judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases
involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also wish
to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, “to stimulate
the creation and publication of edifying matter,” Leval 1134, are
not always best served by automatically granting injunctive
relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds
of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. §502(a) (court “may ... grant ... injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement”) (emphasis added); Leval 1132 (while in
the “vast majority of cases, [an injunctive] remedy is justified
because most infringements are simple piracy,” such cases are
180. Id. at 590-92. The Court recognized that a parody might harm markets for the
parodied work because its criticism was effective, but this is not the type of harm that
copyright law aims to avert. Id. at 591-92. It noted that Campbell had not presented evidence
about possible harms to the market for rap derivatives of songs such as Orbison’s. Id. at 590.
181. See Clark D. Asay, Arielle Sloan & Dean Sobczak, Is Transformative Use Eating the
World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2020); Samuelson, supra note 160, at 825-39.
182. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that
digitizing books to index their contents and make snippets available was transformative);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that search engine copying
of images for purposes of making them more accessible was transformative); Sony Comput.
Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that reverse engineering
software to discern interface information was transformative).
183. Campbell’s note 10 has been cited numerous times for the proposition that an
injunctive remedy is justified in cases involving simple piracy. See, e.g., Buena Vista Home
Ent., Inc. v. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 207 (3d Cir. 2003) (defendant monetized clips
of Disney copyrighted films); Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (movie copied set design from plaintiff ’s book).
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“worlds apart from many of those raising reasonable contentions
of fair use” where “there may be a strong public interest in the
publication of the secondary work [and] the copyright owner's
interest may be adequately protected by an award of damages
for whatever infringement is found”); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.
2d 1465, 1479 (CA9 1988) (finding “special circumstances” that
would cause “great injustice” to defendants and “public injury”
were injunction to issue), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207 (1990).184

If upon remand the trial court found that Campbell took too much
or caused harm to the market for rap derivative works,185 the
Court’s note 10 opened the door to a compensatory award rather
than injunctive relief.
B. The Modest Impact of Campbell’s Note 10 on the Availability
of Injunctive Relief Before eBay
In the first dozen years after the Campbell decision, courts
withheld injunctive relief on account of plausible or strong fair use
defenses in only three cases that cited to Campbell’s note 10.186
Campbell’s conception of transformative fair uses and of injunctive relief in close fair use cases made the most profound difference
in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.187 Suntrust held the
copyright in Margaret Mitchell’s novel Gone with the Wind
(GWTW).188 It sued Houghton Mifflin for copyright infringement
because Alice Randall’s forthcoming book, The Wind Done Gone

184. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
185. Id. at 593-94 (remanding for further fact-finding on possible harms to that market).
186. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 932 n.19 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding Texaco
researchers’ photocopying of journal articles likely unfair use, but noting “[t]hough neither
the limited trial nor this appeal requires consideration of the publishers’ remedy if infringement is ultimately found, we note that the context of this dispute appears to make ill-advised
an injunction, which, in any event, has not been sought. If the dispute is not now settled, this
appears to be an appropriate case for exploration of the possibility of a court-imposed compulsory license.”); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying
preliminary injunction because documentary’s use of clips from movies was likely fair use).
187. 268 F.3d at 1276-77 (holding trial court should not have issued a preliminary injunction to stop the book’s publication).
188. Id. at 1259.
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(TWDG), drew heavily from GWTW.189 It told much the same story,
albeit from the vantage point of an enslaved person rather than
slaveholders.190 Randall appropriated characters, major plot elements, and several scenes from GWTW, as well as some verbatim
dialogue and descriptions.191
Because the taking from GWTW was so substantial, the trial
court ruled that Suntrust had established a likelihood of success on
the merits, which triggered a presumption of irreparable harm,
and so it ordered Houghton Mifflin to discontinue its planned publication of TWDG.192 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary
injunction, characterizing it as an “unlawful prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment.”193 In a subsequent opinion, the
court declared that injunctive relief was inappropriate because
Houghton Mifflin raised a plausible fair use defense.194
Channeling Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit characterized TWDG
as a “parody,” saying this term included works whose “aim is to
comment upon or criticize a prior work by appropriating elements
of the original in creating a new artistic, as opposed to scholarly or
journalistic, work.”195 The court characterized Randall’s book as
“highly transformative,” for it was “not a general commentary upon
the Civil-War-era American South, but a specific criticism of and
rejoinder to the depiction of slavery and the relationships between
blacks and whites” as presented in GWTW; its goal was to “explode
the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during
and after the Civil War.”196 To parody a work such as GWTW, as
Randall did, it was necessary to copy enough from that work to
make the parody effective.197 Although Suntrust argued that
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1259, 1267, 1270.
191. Id. at 1259, 1266-67.
192. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1383-84, 1386 (N.D. Ga.
2001). The trial court presumed irreparable harm from plaintiff ’s prima facie showing of
infringement. Id. at 1384. Although that court cited to Campbell’s note 10 regarding
injunctive relief, id. at 1371, it concluded that on balance, copyright interests in the first work
outweighed public access to the second work, id. at 1385.
193. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
194. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1276-77 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10).
195. Id. at 1268-69. TWDG is a critical commentary on GWTW, not a parody.
196. Id. at 1269-70.
197. Id. at 1270, 1273-74.
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Randall’s book would negatively impact the market value of licenses
it had granted or could grant to create derivative works, it had
proffered little evidence that TWDG would supplant demand for the
types of derivative works Suntrust was willing to license.198 Nor had
Suntrust otherwise proven it would suffer irreparable harm absent
an injunction.199 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that any harm to
Suntrust’s copyright interests could be adequately compensated by
a monetary award.200
Further channeling Campbell, the court noted that Campbell had
recognized that the public interest is not always served by the
issuance of an injunction.201 Going beyond Campbell, the Eleventh
Circuit stated “that the public interest is always served in promoting First Amendment values and in preserving the public domain
from encroachment.”202 Given that Houghton Mifflin had a plausible
fair use defense, the lower court’s injunction was “a prior restraint
on speech because the public had not had access to Randall’s ideas
or viewpoint in the form of expression that she chose.”203 Had AcuffRose prevailed in Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit would likely have
had a much less favorable view of Houghton Mifflin’s fair use defense.
Much stronger and more conventional was the fair use defense in
Hofheinz v. AMC Productions, Inc.204 AMC had paid Hofheinz
$36,000 for rights to use several clips from her late husband’s films

198. Id. at 1275. Judge Marcus’s concurrence pointed out that Suntrust would not have
authorized Randall’s book because it featured miscegenation and homosexuality, of which
Suntrust disapproved. Id. at 1277, 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 1276 (majority opinion). The Eleventh Circuit criticized the district court for
presuming irreparable injury. Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10).
200. Id. at 1277.
201. Id. at 1276-77.
202. Id. at 1276.
203. Id. at 1277. Judge Marcus’s concurrence stated that Suntrust “may not use copyright
to shield [GWTW] from unwelcome comment, a policy that would extend intellectual property
protection ‘into the precincts of censorship.’” Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (quoting Pat
Conroy, id. at 1282 n.6, an author whom Suntrust had once considered as a candidate to write
a GWTW sequel). The Suntrust case later settled. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate
Settles “Gone With the Wind” Suit, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/
2002/05/10/business/mitchell-estate-settles-gone-with-the-wind-suit.html [https://perma.cc/
69LU-7MDZ]. Randall has since written and published five additional novels to date. About,
ALICE RANDALL, https://www.alicerandall.com/about [https://perma.cc/2PWF-B67J].
204. 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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in a documentary.205 To qualify for an Academy Award, AMC had to
show the documentary for seven days in theatres, a type of public
performance not contemplated in the original agreement.206 Even
though AMC paid her an additional sum, Hofheinz claimed that
the final film’s use of the clips went beyond the licensed uses.207
The court concluded that AMC’s use was transformative and that
the challenged uses were “‘too few, too short, and too small in relation to the whole’ to undercut the market” for Hofheinz’s works.208
Because Hofheinz had not proven a likelihood of success on the
merits or irreparable harm, the court denied her request for a
preliminary injunction.209 The public’s interest in being able to see
the documentary weighed against Hofheinz’s infringement claim.210
The court cited to Campbell’s note 10 in support of this proposition,
although Hofheinz was not really a close fair use case.211
Another close fair use case, albeit one in which that defense
failed, was Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video.212 Passport spent more than $2 million to prepare a sixteen-hour video documentary about the life of Elvis Presley with sixteen episodes, each
on a different theme.213 Passport interviewed 200 people on various
aspects of Elvis’s life, often using photographs or video clips from
television programs to illustrate its points without clearing rights
to them.214 The video clips were generally a few seconds to thirty
seconds long.215 The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits because of the commerciality of Passport’s project, the creativity of the plaintiff’s works,
and the frequency with which clips permeated the documentary,

205. Id. at 130-31.
206. Id. at 131.
207. Id. at 133.
208. Id. at 140 (quoting Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp.
490, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
209. Id. at 141.
210. Id.
211. Id. The court cited to Campbell’s note 10 because an injunction would, on balance,
cause irreparable harm to the defendant, whereas plaintiff could be fully compensated with
monetary damages. Id. at 141 n.13.
212. 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).
213. Id. at 624-27.
214. Id. at 625.
215. Id.
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often showing the “heart” of the works.216 Hence, the trial court
preliminarily enjoined distribution of the documentary.217
Although the Ninth Circuit viewed Passport Video as a close case,
a panel majority ruled that the trial court had not abused its discretion in rejecting Passport’s fair use defense and granting a preliminary injunction.218 The panel was unconvinced by Passport’s
argument that the First Amendment was a separate basis for withholding preliminary injunctions in close fair use cases.219 It quickly
disposed of that argument by saying that any First Amendment
concerns had been subsumed by the fair use analysis.220
Judge Noonan’s dissent chastised the trial court for its “demonstrably wrong” analysis of Passport’s fair use defense as well as for
its inattention to the public interest and balance of hardship
factors.221 Because the case involved “the biography of a man with
an immense following,” Judge Noonan thought that the trial court
should have “ke[pt] in mind that injunctions are a device of equity
and are to be used equitably, and that a court suppressing speech
must be aware that it is trenching on a zone made sacred by the
First Amendment.”222 The Noonan dissent did not invoke Campbell’s
note 10 as a basis for withholding injunctive relief, relying instead
on the Ninth Circuit’s earlier endorsement of a compensatory
remedy in Abend.223

216. Id. at 625-30.
217. Id. at 626.
218. Id. at 628-31. The majority mentioned Campbell in relation to the significance of
transformativeness in fair use cases, but not in relation to injunctions. Id. at 628. The Ninth
Circuit later “proclaim[ed] that the ‘King’ is dead, referring to Elvis Presley the case—to the
extent it supported the use of a presumption of irreparable harm in issuing injunctive relief.”
Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2011).
219. Passport Video, 349 F.3d at 626.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 631-34 (Noonan, J., dissenting). Judge Noonan later filed an amended dissent.
See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 357 F.3d 896, 897-99 (9th Cir. 2004).
222. Id. at 899 (citing Lemley & Volokh, supra note 18).
223. Id. at 899 (citing Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988)); see supra
text accompanying notes 45-60 (discussing Abend); see also Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner
Ent. Co., 98 F.3d 33, 35 n.3 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting that trial court should consider
compensation instead of injunctive relief for Turner’s failure to get renewal license for Laurel
and Hardy videos in its film, as in Abend).

2022]

WITHHOLDING INJUNCTIONS IN COPYRIGHT CASES

807

C. Other Public Interest and Balance of Hardships Rationales
for Withholding Injunctions Pre-eBay
Close fair use cases were not the only post-Campbell, pre-eBay
litigations in which courts considered denying injunctive relief, despite findings of infringement, when this would be contrary to the
public interest or when injunctions would have detrimental effects
on third parties.
The Supreme Court itself heeded a public interest concern when
considering the prospect of injunctive relief in its affirmance of a
Second Circuit ruling that the New York Times had infringed
copyrights in freelancer articles by licensing their articles to online
databases without getting permission in New York Times Co. v.
Tasini.224 The Times’s main argument was that it had the right to
license freelancers’ stories to online databases under the re-publication privilege established in 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).225 But it also
argued that the grant of an injunction following an infringement
ruling would have “devastating” consequences for preservation of
the historical record of news events because the databases would
have to delete the freelancers’ stories.226
Invoking Campbell’s note 10, the Court in Tasini observed that “it
hardly follows from today's decision that an injunction against the
inclusion of these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance
articles in any databases) must issue.”227 Because the freelancers
224. 533 U.S. 483 (2001). It was rare, but not unknown, for post-Campbell, pre-eBay
decisions to invoke access-to-information interests when denying injunctions. See Prac. Mgmt.
Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 133 F.3d 1140
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Abend for the proposition that trial court could order PMIC to pay
reasonable royalty for use of the AMA copyrighted codes instead of granting an injunction,
given that federal regulations required use of AMA codes).
225. Under § 201(c), owners of copyrights in collective works (for example, newspapers)
have the right to “reproduc[e] and distribut[e] the contribution [to a collective work] as part
of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). Because the freelancer articles were not arranged
in databases as they had been in the printed newspapers, the Court held that the § 201(c)
privilege did not apply. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 504.
226. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 504. Documentary filmmaker Ken Burns, among others, filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of the Times on this ground. Id. at 505. Justice Stevens also
expressed concern about preserving the public record of historical events. See id. at 520
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 505 (quoting Campbell’s note 10 for the proposition that the goals of copyright
law are “not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief”). The Court also
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would have an interest in having their work kept available to the
public, the Court surmised that the litigants should be able to reach
an agreement retaining the articles in the databases.228 Failing
this, the lower court could decide on a compensatory remedy.229 The
Court observed that “speculation about future harms is no basis for
this Court to shrink authorial rights.”230
Campbell had no influence, though, in several architectural work
cases in the pre-eBay case law in which courts denied injunctive
relief that would have stopped or required modifications of construction projects. Prior to 1990, no comparable cases existed because architectural works were ineligible for U.S. copyright protection.231
Courts sometimes found defendants liable for infringing copyrighted
architectural plans, but limited injunctive relief to ordering defendants to make no further use of infringing plans.232 Courts could not
enjoin the construction of buildings.233
After the passage of the Architectural Work Copyright Protection
Act of 1990,234 courts now had authorization to enjoin the construction of infringing buildings.235 For projects that had yet to start or
observed that 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) provided that courts “may” issue injunctions. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Ironically, it was the New York Times, not the freelancers, that proposed to delete
the infringing articles from the online databases. The newspaper said it would do this unless
the freelancers signed a waiver of claims against it. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 184 F. Supp.
2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting the Times’s motion to dismiss because Tasini did not sign
the waiver, so he lacked standing to sue).
230. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06.
231. Prior to 1990, buildings were considered “useful articles” lacking aesthetic elements
separable from their utilitarian aspects. See David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has Full Protection Made a Difference?, 18 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 3 (2010). Prior to enactment of the Architectural Work Copyright Protection Act
of 1990 (AWCPA), some buildings could be protected by copyright law as sculptures if
monumental and nonfunctional. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 n.43 (1990); see also
Circular 41: Copyright Registration of Architectural Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ41.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FP5-6LGJ].
232. See Shipley, supra note 231, at 3.
233. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ordering
impoundment of infringing plans, but not enjoining construction of house of that design).
234. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133. The Act added “architectural works” to
copyright’s subject matter provision, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5), and a new limitation on exclusive
rights in architectural works, 17 U.S.C. § 120.
235. One early bill would have made injunctions available only when construction of the
allegedly infringing building had not yet begun. H.R. 3990, 101st Cong. (1990). At a
congressional hearing, some recommended that Congress not limit the availability of
injunctions. See Architectural Design Protection: Hearing on H.R. 3998 and H.R. 3991 Before
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were in early stages, courts have indeed issued injunctions to stop
constructions that would infringe copyrights in the buildings’ designs.236 However, courts have been reluctant to enjoin projects that
were quite far along or nearing completion. Sometimes this was
because of the effects an injunction would have on third parties, a
balance of hardships tipped in the defendants’ favor, or a public
interest supporting denial of injunctive relief.
An exemplary third-party effects case was Balsamo/Olson Group,
Inc. v. Bradley Place Ltd. Partnership.237 Bradley infringed Balsamo’s copyright by using the architects’ design to construct sixty
units of affordable housing for senior citizens.238 Fifty-four units had
been completed and certificates for their occupancy had been
granted.239 Bradley did not object to being enjoined against future
infringements, but opposed Balsamo’s requested injunction that
would have forbidden Bradley from completing the last six units in
the complex, which were more than 95 percent finished.240
The court was persuaded that Balsamo had proven irreparable
harm from the infringement and that the public interest favored
protecting copyrighted works.241 Yet it recognized that the requested
injunction would have adverse effects “on nonparties who have a
significant interest in the completion of the low income senior housing,” including “senior citizens who have signed leases and who
expect to occupy the units within a few days” as well as the interests of “institutional investors upon whose financial backs this
housing program for needy senior citizens depends.”242 The balance

the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., & the Admin. of Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 18-19, 117, 125, 147 (1990).
236. See, e.g., Ronald Mayotte & Assocs. v. MGC Bldg. Co., 885 F. Supp. 148, 153-54 & n.4
(E.D. Mich. 1994); Value Grp., Inc. v. Mendham Lake Ests., L.P., 800 F. Supp. 1228, 1235
(D.N.J. 1992).
237. 966 F. Supp. 757 (C.D. Ill. 1996); see also Flying J, Inc. v. Cent. CA Kenworth, 45 F.
App’x 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying permanent injunction against further operation of the
infringing truck stop in part because of prejudice to nonparty competing franchisor).
238. Balsamo/Olson, 966 F. Supp. at 759.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 760.
241. Id. at 763-64. The impacts of an injunction on third parties should be considered under
the public interest factor. The balance of hardships factor typically focuses on the relative
impacts of an injunction on the litigants.
242. Id. at 764. The court noted that completing the units might enable Balsamo to collect
damages from Bradley. Id.
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of hardships consequently weighed against an injunction to stop
completion of the units.243
Trueblood v. Davis was an architectural work infringement case
from this period in which the court denied an injunction that would
have required the defendant to modify the design of a house under
construction so that it would not infringe.244 Trueblood contracted
with the Raper family to design a distinctive house, granting them
the exclusive right to control construction of houses of that design
within a one-hundred-mile radius to ensure the uniqueness of their
home.245 The Davis family managed to obtain a copy of the Raper
floor plans which the Davises used to construct a nearly identical
home within the one-hundred-mile zone.246 Both Trueblood and the
Rapers sued the Davises for infringement.247
The main question in Trueblood was what, if any, injunctive
relief to order.248 The plaintiffs recognized that it would be unreasonable to ask the court to order the Davis house to be destroyed,
but they wanted the court to order the Davises to modify the design
of their nearly completed home so that it would no longer infringe.249
Because the requested modifications would cost $298,000, the court
concluded this hardship to the Davises outweighed the irreparable
injury to the Rapers of lost uniqueness.250
More mixed was the outcome of an architecture infringement
lawsuit in Palmetto Builders & Designers, Inc. v. Unireal, Inc.251
Palmetto owned exclusive rights to build houses of certain

243. Id. at 764-65.
244. No. 2:97-CV-125, 1997 WL 34611647, at *3-5 (M.D.N.C. June 12, 1997); see also
Bonner v. Dawson, No. Civ.A. 502CV00065, 2003 WL 22432941, at *8 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2003)
(rejecting request for permanent injunction to destroy or require modifications to the infringing building, as there was an adequate remedy at law).
245. See Trueblood, 1997 WL 34611647, at *1.
246. See id. at *2.
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *4 n.3; see 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (authorizing the destruction of infringing copies).
250. Id. at *4-5. But see Yankee Candle Co. v. New Eng. Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154,
161 (D. Mass. 1998) (injunction required the defendant to undertake structural modifications
to its store to avoid infringement). Although the parties ultimately settled, the court
nevertheless issued a consent decree forbidding the defendant from including certain design
features in its stores. Yankee Candle Co. v. New Eng. Candle Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D. Mass.
1998).
251. See 342 F. Supp. 2d 468 (D.S.C. 2004).
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designs.252 Palmetto showed some of these designs to two prospective clients who then took Palmetto’s plans to Unireal and arranged
for that firm to build houses of those designs instead of hiring Palmetto.253 Because one of the houses was nearing completion and the
homeowners were getting ready to move in, the court refused to enjoin Unireal from finishing that construction project.254 However, the
court enjoined it from further construction on the other infringing
house until the design was modified to be non-infringing.255
As against the homeowners whose home design infringed, the
court in Palmetto decided that “because the constructed homes
constitute infringing copies of the Plaintiff ’s copyrighted works, they
cannot be lawfully resold without the Plaintiff ’s permission.”256 The
court reasoned that the right to resell one’s copy of a copyrighted
work is statutorily limited to owners of “lawfully made” copies.257
The court emphasized that “[a]n infringing copy ... does not fit
within the ‘first sale’ doctrine embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) and
cannot be resold without the resale causing an additional act of
infringement.”258 If the homeowners in Palmetto sold their infringing houses, that would “constitute an act of infringement for which
the copyright owner could bring suit.”259 The court, therefore, enjoined them from selling their home without Palmetto’s permission.260

252. Id. at 469.
253. Id. at 470.
254. Id. at 474.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 473. The owners of the home that the court ordered to be modified to avert
infringement should be able to resell without Palmetto’s permission. See infra text
accompanying notes 351-54 for further discussion of the resales of infringing house issue.
257. Palmetto, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 473; see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
258. Palmetto, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
259. Id. The court considered sale of an infringing house to be distribution of a copy under
17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Id.
260. Id. at 474. The court believed that any resale of the infringing house during the
duration of the copyright term would infringe. Id. at 473. It did not address whether
purchasers of an infringing house would themselves infringe if they resold or rented that
house. See id. For an argument that such actions should not constitute infringement, see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 269
(2016).
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D. Withholding Injunctions in Disputes Over License Agreements
Courts may be wary about granting an injunction when litigants
have disagreements about the proper interpretation of a contract.
This was tested in a lawsuit between Sun Microsystems, developer
of Java technologies, and one of its licensees, Microsoft Corporation,
over the latter’s failure to abide by its contractual commitment to
distribute software that was compatible with the Java Native Interface (JNI). When Microsoft began distributing a “polluted” version of Java that broke Sun’s “write once, run everywhere” objective
for Java technologies, Sun sued it for copyright and trademark
infringement, as well as for breach of contract and unfair competition.261
Sun moved for a preliminary injunction to forbid Microsoft from
distributing the incompatible version of Java in its software.262 It
persuaded the district court that Microsoft’s distribution of incompatible software constituted copyright infringement.263 The court
granted the injunction because Sun had shown a likelihood of
success on the merits of this claim, hence it was proper to presume
irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.264 The order:
barred Microsoft from, among other things: (1) distributing any
operating systems or internet browsers containing Java technology unless they supported JNI; (2) distributing any Java development tools unless they supported JNI and included a
compiler with a default mode that disabled Microsoft's incompatible modifications; (3) incorporating any additional Microsoft
keyword extensions or compiler directives into its Java software
development tools.265

261. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1999). In
the post-eBay period, it became more common for courts to deny injunctions in contract
dispute cases. See infra Part III.D.2.
262. See Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1117.
263. See id.
264. Compare id., with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979-81 (9th Cir. 2011)
(observing that cases such as Sun Microsystems that relied on the presumption were
effectively overruled by eBay).
265. Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1118-19. Microsoft was also barred from conditioning
its product or logo licenses on the exclusive use of either Microsoft’s Java virtual machine or
Microsoft’s native code interfaces. Id. at 1119.
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The Ninth Circuit vacated this injunction.266 Although agreeing
with the district court that Sun was likely to succeed on the merits
of its claim that Microsoft had not abided by the license’s compatibility requirements, the appellate court was not persuaded that
these commitments were conditions of the license, breach of which
constituted copyright infringement, rather than, as Microsoft insisted, a breach of license covenants.267 Because the district court
had not addressed this issue when granting the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of the
preliminary injunction motion.268
On remand, the district court ruled that the compatibility
provisions of Sun’s license with Microsoft were indeed covenants,
the breach of which did not support Sun’s copyright claim; consequently, it denied Sun’s motion for reissuance of the preliminary
injunction.269 However, that court later reissued a preliminary
injunction against Microsoft’s distribution of Java-incompatible
software under California unfair competition law.270
III. THE IMPACTS OF EBAY ON INJUNCTIONS IN COPYRIGHT CASES
The Supreme Court’s statements in Campbell and Tasini that
injunctions need not always issue in copyright infringement cases
went “largely unheeded” until eBay “elevated the discussion from
dicta and footnotes and incidental commentary, to full text and
center stage.”271 eBay was, of course, a patent, not a copyright
case.272 Yet, in eBay the Court relied on three of its copyright
cases—Dun, Campbell, and Tasini—in support of its ruling that
courts should exercise discretion in considering whether to issue
injunctions in patent infringement cases.273 From this, it should
266. Id. at 1123.
267. Id. at 1121-22.
268. Id. at 1123-24.
269. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032-33 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
270. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1006-07 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
271. Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay—Four-Factor
Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom?, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 449, 456 (2008).
272. eBay was also a permanent, not a preliminary, injunction case; this caused some
courts to think it inapplicable to copyright preliminary injunctions. See infra note 308.
273. The Court’s invocation of copyright precedents in eBay on the discretionary nature of
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have been obvious that the Justices thought the eBay standard
should apply in both types of IP cases.
Notwithstanding the Court’s reliance on these copyright precedents, courts in copyright cases largely ignored eBay for the first
several years after that decision.274 Over time, however, all but one
of the circuit courts have recognized that the old precept that courts
should presume irreparable harm based on proof of a likelihood or
actuality of copyright infringement was no longer sound law, and
district courts now generally heed this proscription.275
Although post-eBay courts generally issue permanent injunctions
in simple piracy cases,276 eBay has reinforced judicial discretion to
withhold injunctions in appropriate cases. If plaintiffs fail to offer
proof of irreparable harm, this is now likely to result in a denial of
injunctive relief. Courts in the post-eBay period have also become
more comfortable withholding injunctions when persuaded that
damage awards would be an adequate remedy. Consideration of
hardships to defendants or third parties and the impact of an
injunction on the public interest are also more common after eBay.
Courts are much less likely to grant injunctions when the irreparable harms that copyright claimants seek to prevent pertain to
non-copyright interests, such as the protection of the plaintiff ’s
privacy.
Of course, as in the pre-Campbell and Campbell-to-eBay periods,
courts in the post-eBay period have often relied upon conventional
rationales for denying injunctive relief, as when there was a low

injunctive relief is of interest because the Campbell and Tasini endorsements of withholding
injunctions were dicta. Yet after eBay, this recognition of the discretionary nature of
injunctions and tests for issuance eventually migrated back to copyright from patent law. See
infra Part III.B-D.
274. Liu, supra note 7, at 218; Phillips, supra note 7, at 407; see also Christina Bohannan,
Copyright Harm and Injunctions, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 17 (2012). There were,
however, some exceptions. See Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532,
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (following eBay in denying permanent injunction in architectural work
case); Magna-Rx, Inc. v. Holley, No. CV 05-3545-PHX, 2008 WL 5068977, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov.
25, 2008) (following eBay, denying plaintiff ’s request for permanent injunction in default
judgment copyright case); infra text accompanying notes 345-56 (discussing Galloway).
275. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating preliminary
injunction because trial court failed to consider eBay factors and presumed irreparable harm
from likely success on the merits). For further discussion of Colting, see infra Part III.B.
276. See infra Part III.E; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.06[B][1][c][ii].
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likelihood of success on the merits277 or of future infringements,278
when plaintiffs unduly delayed seeking relief,279 and sometimes a
combination of these factors.280
A. eBay v. MercExchange
MercExchange sued eBay for infringing its patent on an electronic
market system to facilitate sales of goods between private individuals through a central authority capable of securing the transactions.281 A jury found the patent valid and infringed.282 However,
a district court denied MercExchange’s request for a permanent
injunction that would have shut down eBay’s auction service.283
Because MercExchange was a nonpracticing entity whose business
consisted of licensing patents, the district court thought damages
would be an adequate remedy.284 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed, citing its general rule that injunctions
should issue upon a finding of patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances for which eBay didn’t qualify.285
277. See, e.g., Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt., Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532,
535 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing “thin” copyright in Christmas light sculpture in animal
shapes); CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1318 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(finding parody of CCA’s book likely fair use); Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F.
Supp. 2d 310, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding use of fifteen seconds of “Imagine” in documentary
likely fair use).
278. See infra note 332 (listing citations to several such cases).
279. See, e.g., Gowan Co. v. Aceto Agric. Chems., No. CV-09-1124-PHX, 2009 WL 2028387,
at *5 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2009) (delay in filing complaint undermined claim of irreparable harm
from copying of chemical label); Berlent v. Focus Features, LLC, No. Civ. 2834, 2006 WL
1594478, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2006) (delay undermined claim of irreparable harm for
alleged infringement of song in movie).
280. See, e.g., Battelle Energy All., LLC v. Southfork Sec., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219
(D. Idaho 2013) (finding weak evidence of software infringement; laches weakened irreparable harm argument); Scott-Blanton v. Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP, 495 F. Supp. 2d
74, 78-80 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding weak likelihood of success that movie infringed copyright in
plaintiff ’s story; delay in seeking injunction weighed against irreparable harm finding).
281. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D. Va. 2007).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712-13 (E.D. Va. 2003).
285. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547
U.S. 388 (2006). On remand, the district court once again denied MercExchange’s motion for
a permanent injunction, in part because of questions about validity of patent and in part
because of MercExchange’s willingness to license patents. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at
568-70.
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The Supreme Court’s eBay decision rejected the Federal Circuit’s
“categorical rule” that injunctions should virtually always issue
after a finding of patent infringement as well as the district court’s
“categorical rule” that injunctions should not issue against nonpracticing entities whose business consisted of licensing patents.286
The Court endorsed the general principle that granting injunctive
relief is always subject to equitable discretion.287 eBay characterized
the statutory “right to exclude” as being “distinct” from whether the
plaintiff had a “right” to an injunctive remedy.288 Citing to some of
its non-IP precedents,289 the Court ruled that to get an injunction,
a plaintiff must always prove:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.290

The Court asserted that “[t]hese familiar principles apply with
equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”291 Because

286. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. Christopher Seaman’s empirical study of the post-eBay case
law shows that courts rarely issue injunctions in nonpracticing entity patent infringement
cases. See Seaman, supra note 1, at 1987-88.
287. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
288. Id. at 392. Under this view, violation of an exclusive IP right does not, by itself, cause
irreparable harm. For a discussion of differing conceptions of exclusive rights as they bear on
the availability of injunctive relief, see Balganesh, supra note 20, at 602-06.
289. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541-44
(1987) (error to presume irreparable harm in environmental protection case; discussing
equitable considerations that should inform the exercise of discretion in deciding whether to
issue preliminary injunctions); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982)
(concluding that Congress did not intend to limit the exercise of equitable discretion in
granting injunctions when enacting water pollution laws)).
290. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. Although eBay directed courts to find whether the plaintiff “has
suffered” an irreparable injury, id., the Court subsequently clarified that the focus should be
on whether the plaintiff “is likely to suffer” irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
291. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. Remedies scholar Douglas Laycock has criticized eBay’s fourfactor test for the issuance of permanent injunctions as having been adapted from a common
test for preliminary injunctive relief, saying that this test “make[s] no sense as applied to
permanent injunctions.” LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 426.
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that statute provides that courts “may” issue injunctions,292 the
Court inferred that Congress must have intended for these principles to apply in patent cases, as the Court had previously recognized
in Dun,293 Campbell,294 and Tasini295 in respect of copyright infringements.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion observed that some patent
owners whose business models are based on licensing, not the
production and sale of goods or services, had used the threat of an
injunction “and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its
violation ... as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees” for use of
their patent rights.296 Because patents often cover small components
of larger products, the threat of injunctive relief against manufacture of the infringer’s whole product gave patentees “undue leverage in negotiations,” when the public interest might be better served
by a damage award.297 Other considerations bearing on the exercise
of equitable discretion, Justice Kennedy said, were the “potential
vagueness” of the IP right and the “suspect validity” of such
rights.298
In two of its subsequent decisions, the Court reinforced eBay’s
emphasis on the exercise of equitable discretion when considering
injunctive relief. The first and most significant was the Court’s 2008
decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.299 It
292. 35 U.S.C. § 283. The Court pointed to one of the Federal Circuit’s precedents
recognizing that grants of injunctions were subject to equitable discretion. eBay, 547 U.S. at
394 (citing Roche Prods., Inc v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). The
Roberts concurrence observed that injunctions had issued in the vast majority of patent
infringement cases and this page of history should be respected. Id. at 394-95 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring). Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined this concurrence.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 166-85.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 224-30.
296. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Stevens, Souter and
Breyer joined this concurrence. Abend presented a comparable scenario in the copyright
context. See supra text accompanying notes 45-60.
297. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J. concurring). The small-part-of-a-complex-product
issue has arisen in cases such as Belushi and Tasini. See supra text accompanying notes 4144, 224-30.
298. eBay, 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J. concurring). The scope of copyrights is often vaguer
than the scope of patents. Although the invalidity of rights is less an issue in copyright than
in patent cases, some copyrights have such a thin scope that courts should decline to grant
an injunction, as in Dun v. Lumberman’s Credit Ass’n. See 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908).
299. 555 U.S. 7, 20, 24 (2008). In Winter, the Court made clear that equitable considerations affect grants of preliminary as well as permanent injunctions. Id. at 32 (“The
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articulated a four-factor test for deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctions under which the plaintiff must show (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable
harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) a balance of equities
tipping in its favor, and (4) the public interest not being disserved
by an injunction.300 Winter characterized injunctive relief as an
“extraordinary remedy.”301 It criticized lower courts for holding that
irreparable harm need merely be a “possibility” when there was a
strong likelihood of success on the merits; Winter says that irreparable harm must be “likely.”302
Moreover, even when harm is irreparable, Winter said that the
balance of hardships and the public interest factors might outweigh that harm, for injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.”303 The Court vacated a lower court’s injunction against the Navy’s use of sonar technology because it had
failed to consider the balance of equities and public interest factors.304 The Court thought those factors tipped in favor of the Navy,
even if National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) had shown a
standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction
with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather
than actual success.” (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12
(1987))). As of August 29, 2021, Winter had been cited 14,337 times for its articulation of the
four-factor test on Westlaw. Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, (search “555
U.S. 7;” then select “citing references” hyperlink; then filter by “cases” and “headnote topic
212k1092 k”). This is more than four times the number of citations to eBay, which was cited
3,220 times. Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, (search “547 U.S. 388;” then
select “citing references” hyperlink; then filter by “cases” and “headnote topic 212k1032 k”).
Winter is, however, less frequently cited in copyright injunction cases than eBay. See Sag &
Samuelson, supra note 1, at 21.
300. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Unlike eBay, Winter did not treat the (in)adequacy of legal
remedies as a separate factor. By stating that preliminary injunctions should only issue if
plaintiffs have proven likely success on the merits, id., Winter cast doubt about whether
courts can issue preliminary injunctions when there is a serious question going to the merits
and a balance of equities that tips toward the plaintiff. Cf. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559
U.S. 1089 (2010) (likelihood of success on the merits necessary); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d
68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (accepting a serious question going to the merits as an alternative basis
for a preliminary injunction). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Winter did not perceive the
majority as having rejected the sliding-scale standard used in several circuits. 555 U.S. at 51
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
301. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (majority opinion).
302. Id. at 21-22.
303. Id. at 24.
304. Id. at 32-33.
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strong likelihood that the Navy had violated U.S. environmental
laws.305
Another of the Court’s significant post-eBay remedy-related
decisions was Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., in which the
Court ruled that a long delay (in that case, eighteen years) in
bringing a lawsuit was not a complete defense to copyright infringement claims.306 That delay could, however, be considered when
deliberating about whether to issue an injunction.307
B. The Slow Demise of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm
In the first few years after eBay and Winter, courts in copyright
cases seem to have paid little attention to eBay, and some questioned whether eBay’s four-factor test should be applied in copyright
cases.308 An empirical study of the post-eBay case law published in
2012 reported that a large percentage of copyright infringement
cases decided in the first three years after the eBay decision ignored

305. Id. at 26-28. Environmental law scholars have expressed reservations about decisions
such as eBay and Winter insofar as they have made enforcement of environmental laws more
difficult. See, e.g., Craig N. Johnston, Ensuring Compliance: Equitable Relief in the Face of
Violations of Substantive Environmental Standards, 49 ENV’T L. 793, 794-95, 802-03 (2019).
Professor Richard Hasen considers eBay and Winter to be part of a larger trend of Supreme
Court conservative majorities making it harder to get injunctions in public law cases in which
governments are the defendants. E-mail from Richard L. Hasen, Chancellor’s Professor of L.,
U.C. Irvine Sch. of L., to Pamela Samuelson, Richard M. Sherman Professor of L., U.C.
Berkeley Sch. of L. (Mar. 24, 2021, 4:39 PM) (on file with author). He characterized eBay as
having put a “new thumb on the scale” against injunctions. Id. This kind of thumb on the
scale may be justifiable in copyright cases because of the First Amendment and fair use issues
that arise in them, but more problematic as applied to remedies for other types of legal
wrongs that aim to vindicate public law interests. See id.
306. 572 U.S. 663, 686 (2014).
307. Id. at 687. Petrella cited approvingly to Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d
227, 235-36 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying injunctive relief in architectural work infringement case
because plaintiff had not promptly sought relief).
308. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 7, at 420 (reporting eBay’s impact in copyright cases as
“minimal”). Some courts questioned whether eBay’s four-factor test applied to copyright
preliminary injunction cases. See, e.g., Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F. Supp. 2d
310, 319 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A presumption temporarily removing the need to prove
irreparable harm may serve the ends of equity at this early stage of the litigation even if it
would be inappropriate where the record is complete” because “the record on a motion for a
preliminary injunction is to some degree incomplete.”); Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs.,
Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (declining to apply eBay in preliminary
injunction ruling).
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eBay altogether.309 The study reported that only 11 percent cited
eBay at all,310 and those that did generally applied its factors “in a
very cursory and mechanical way.”311 As will become clear in Sections C and D, courts have taken eBay much more seriously in the
past decade.
By ignoring or narrowly construing eBay and Winter, courts in the
early years continued to presume irreparable harm whenever
copyright plaintiffs had shown a likelihood or actuality of success on
the merits. Consider the 2009 district court ruling in Salinger v.
Colting, which preliminarily enjoined publication of Colting’s book
imagining Salinger’s fictional character, Holden Caulfield, from
Catcher in the Rye as an old man.312 That court relied on Second
Circuit precedents that presumed irreparable harm when a plaintiff
was likely to succeed on the merits.313 Colting argued that the
presumption was no longer sound law after eBay and that all four

309. Liu, supra note 7, at 218. Liu reported that of the 506 copyright injunction cases in his
sample, only 11 percent cited to eBay. Id. at 228. But see Sag & Samuelson, supra note 1, at
19-21 (showing that eBay was cited more frequently in the first few years of copyright
injunction cases than Liu reported).
310. Liu, supra note 7, at 228.
311. Id. at 218. More than forty commentaries have cited Liu for these propositions, often
assuming his conclusions still hold. See, e.g., 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, §§ 13.1.2.2, 13.2.1
(2021) (quoting Liu article at length); Alfred C. Yen, Rethinking Copyright’s Relationship to
the First Amendment, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1225 n.64 (2020) (citing Liu as showing that
plaintiffs establishing copyright infringement get injunctive relief over 90 percent of time);
Amy Adler & Jeanne C. Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property Into Their Own Hands, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 1455, 1499-1500 (2019) (“That said, [successful copyright and trademark
plaintiffs] generally do [get injunctive relief], and one empirical study after the Supreme
Court’s 2006 decision found that courts almost never withhold injunctive relief from successful
copyright plaintiffs.” (citing Liu)). But see Sag & Samuelson, supra note 1, at 19, 26-27
(showing statistically significant lower injunction grant rates in the past decade of copyright
infringement cases).
312. 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-54, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
In an earlier article, I argued that this presumption should not apply in transformative fair
use cases. See Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 67, 68 (2010). Some commentators assert that eBay need not be read as rejecting
presumptions of irreparable harm in copyright cases. See, e.g., David McGowan, Irreparable
Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577, 580 (2010); Andrew F. Spillane, Comment, The
Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 260 (2011) (“[C]ourts should graft a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm onto the first eBay factor.”).
313. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268 n.6.
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eBay factors should be considered, but the district court thought
that eBay had no relevance in copyright cases.314
In 2010, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction in
Colting and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of eBay
and Winter.315 It stated that eBay should be understood as having
repudiated the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases
and mandated that courts must consider all four eBay factors before
granting injunctive relief.316 The Colting decision found further
support for these propositions in Winter, which put the burden on
plaintiffs to make a showing on the four factors to support issuance
of a preliminary injunction.317 The court also recognized that when
defendants raised colorable fair use defenses, both the plaintiff and
defendant had First Amendment interests at stake that should be
considered in preliminary injunction proceedings.318
Soon thereafter, two Ninth Circuit decisions expressed agreement
with Colting that presuming irreparable harm based on a likelihood
of success on the merits was inconsistent with eBay and Winter and
that all four factors must be addressed. The first was Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., which affirmed denial of a preliminary injunction
against Google for displaying and allowing display of thumbnail
versions of Perfect 10’s photographs.319 Invoking eBay and Winter,
the Ninth Circuit rejected Perfect 10’s argument that a court must
314. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010).
315. Id. at 79.
316. Id. at 77-83. The Second Circuit did not question the district court’s conclusion that
Salinger was likely to prevail on the merits. Id. at 83.
317. Id. at 78 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2000)).
318. Id. at 81. Colting cited approvingly to Lemley & Volokh, supra note 18, at 199-202,
which characterized preliminary injunctions in plausible copyright fair use cases as prior
restraints on speech. 607 F.3d at 76, 80-81. For commentary praising Colting for its greater
attention to freedom of expression values in copyright cases, see, e.g., Kathleen K. Olson,
Injunctions and the Public Interest in Fair Use Cases After eBay, 17 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 235,
236 (2012) (praising Colting for “put[ting] an end to the traditional practice of near-automatic
grants of injunctive relief ” and “offer[ing] courts the opportunity to rectify the existing
imbalance between copyright plaintiffs and defendants with credible fair use claims and
restor[ing] the public interest as an integral factor in granting injunctive relief ”); Bohannan,
supra note 274, at 17-18 (emphasizing the free expression interests at stake and praising eBay
and Colting for requiring proof of irreparable harm instead of presuming it in copyright cases).
But see Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of Remedies, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1123, 1130-31 (2013) (“The court’s rhetoric expresses sensitivity toward free
speech interests ... but the decision itself does little to dislodge the permissions-based norms
that prompted remedy reforms in the first place.”).
319. 653 F.3d 976, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2011).
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presume, when there is a likelihood of success on the merits, that
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm should injunctive relief be
withheld.320 It concluded that the circuit’s longstanding rule for a
presumption was “effectively overruled” by the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay.321 Perfect 10 proffered evidence that it was in
financial jeopardy, surely a type of irreparable harm, but it had not
shown that Google’s acts had caused that harm or that an injunction
would mitigate it, so the court concluded that Perfect 10 had
presented insufficient evidence of irreparable harm caused by the
claimed infringement to justify issuance of an injunction.322
A week later, another Ninth Circuit panel also disavowed the
irreparable harm presumption in Flexible Lifeline Systems, Inc. v.
Precision Lift, Inc.323 It reversed a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Precision from using Flexible’s
copyrighted technical drawings for aircraft or vehicle maintenance
stands and platforms because the court had presumed irreparable
harm instead of requiring Flexible to prove it.324 The Ninth Circuit
rejected Flexible’s argument that the presumption survived eBay
and Winter with respect to copyright infringement claims and ruled
that the Supreme Court decisions had made the presumption
impermissible.325 The court directed the district court to address all
four factors before issuing an injunction.326
The Second and the Ninth Circuits were not the first appellate
courts to reject the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright
cases or to embrace full consideration of the eBay factors. The
Fourth Circuit had done so in 2007 and the First and Eleventh
Circuits in 2008.327 Yet because the Second and Ninth Circuits have
320. Id. at 979-81. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that many of its prior decisions had
endorsed a presumption of irreparable harm from a showing of likely success on the merits
of copyright infringement claims. Id. at 979.
321. Id. at 981 (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
322. Id. at 981-82; see also Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 608
n.11 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction because alleged infringement
played minimal role in developing emulation platform and damages would be adequate).
323. 654 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
324. Id. at 991, 993, 1000.
325. Id. at 995-98. The court also relied on the Second Circuit’s Colting decision. See id. at
998-99.
326. Id. at 1000.
327. The first was Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th
Cir. 2007). The second and third were CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 111-12 (1st Cir.
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long been the leading appellate courts in copyright cases328 and the
Colting and Flexible Lifeline Systems decisions were especially wellreasoned, other circuits have relied upon them when newly considering the impact of eBay on the availability of injunctive relief in
copyright cases.329 The Third Circuit was the most recent to join this
chorus.330 Only the Sixth Circuit still presumes irreparable harm in
copyright infringement cases.331
In view of the now-considerable consensus about eBay’s implications for injunctions in copyright cases and its abrogation of
presumptions of irreparable harm, courts have been much more
receptive to defense arguments that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy
the eBay and Winter standards for issuance of injunctions in the
past decade, as numerous cases below illustrate.
C. Post-eBay Cases Denying Permanent Injunctions Despite
Infringement
Although most post-eBay decisions addressing the proper eBay
and Winter injunctive relief tests have involved requests for
2008), and Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008). See infra text accompanying notes 345-56 (discussing Galloway).
328. See, e.g., Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 218 n.74 (noting that Second and Ninth
Circuits are leading jurisdictions in copyright cases). As of August 29, 2021, the Colting
decision had been cited 601 times (at least once in every circuit except the D.C. Circuit),
Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, (search “607 F.3d 68;” then select “citing
references” hyperlink; then filter by “cases” and “jurisdiction”), 406 times for its repudiation
of the presumption of irreparable harm, Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW,
(search “607 F.3d 68;” then select “citing references” hyperlink; then filter by “cases” and
“headnote topic 99k1139(2) k”), and 457 times for the four-factor test, Citing References,
THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, (search “607 F.3d 68;” then select “citing references” hyperlink;
then filter by “cases” and “headnote topic 99k1127(2) k”); Flexible Lifeline Systems had been
cited 282 times in all but the D.C. Circuit, Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW,
(search “654 F.3d 989;” then select “citing references” hyperlink; then filter by “cases” and
“jurisdiction”).
329. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012) (vacating
preliminary injunction because lower court presumed irreparable harm; post-eBay, a court
must consider all factors).
330. TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2019). See infra text accompanying
notes 357-73 (discussing TD Bank).
331. See Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 536 n.1
(6th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging that the irreparable harm presumption was on its “last legs”).
Although declining to repudiate the presumption, the Sixth Circuit stressed the extraordinary
nature of the injunction remedy and the “clear showing” that the movant must make to
qualify for this remedy. Id. at 539.
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preliminary injunctions, some, like eBay, have involved motions for
permanent injunctions. Actual success on the merits no longer
guarantees that plaintiffs can obtain permanent injunctions.332 A
failure to prove irreparable harm or adequacy of compensatory
relief, a balance of hardships tipping toward defendants, and the
public interest have been given serious consideration in several
post-eBay copyright infringement decisions.
1. Failure to Prove Irreparable Harm and Inadequacy of
Legal Remedies
Even though a jury found that Robin Thicke and Pharrell
Williams’s song “Blurred Lines” infringed copyright in Marvin
Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up,” a district court denied the Gaye heirs’
motion for a permanent injunction in Williams v. Bridgeport Music,
Inc. for failing to prove irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal
remedies.333 Invoking the Ninth Circuit’s Perfect 10 decision for the
proposition that injunctions are “extraordinary and drastic” and
“never awarded as of right,” the trial court dutifully reviewed eBay’s
four factors.334 Gaye’s heirs contended that they were suffering
irreparable harm because of the infringement, but the court
concluded that they failed to offer proof of such harm, as eBay
required.335 Although the prospect of future infringement was
certain unless an injunction issued, the court decided that awarding

332. See, e.g., Berry v. Dillon, 291 F. App’x 792, 794-96 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding permanent
injunction unnecessary because there was no risk of continued violations; defendants
reasonably believed their use of plaintiff ’s freight control system software was noninfringing); Getty Images (US), Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 296, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (denying injunction because Microsoft voluntarily withdrew widget after Getty
complained that it caused infringement); Vargas v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 578,
582-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (denying preliminary injunction because defendant had stopped
making infringing video available and tried to stop third parties from doing the same, so there
was no prospect of future irreparable harm).
333. No. LA CV13-06004 (AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *125-26 (C.D. Cal. July
14, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
334. Id. at *122 (quoting Perfect10, Inc. v Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2011)).
335. Id. at *125-27; see also Greg Young Publ’g, Inc. v. Zazzle, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-04587
(KSx), 2020 WL 3871451, at *2-6 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2020) (denying permanent injunction even
though jury found website’s hosting of infringing photos was willful because plaintiff’s claims
of irreparable harm were unconvincing and defendant could answer in damages).
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an ongoing 50 percent royalty would sufficiently compensate the
Gaye heirs for future infringement harms.336
Williams and Thicke argued that the public interest would be
served by withholding injunctive relief because the public loved
their song and there was considerable creativity in the song beyond
the infringing part.337 Although the court accepted that these
considerations had a bearing on the public interest, it concluded
that the public interest factor slightly favored the Gaye heirs
because enforcing copyrights serves the public interest.338 Yet,
because the Gaye heirs had failed to prove irreparable harm and
had an adequate remedy at law, the court denied the requested
injunction.339
Adequacy of compensatory relief explained another post-eBay
decision, Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc. v. Wu, in which a court denied a
permanent injunction despite a finding of infringement.340 Wu made
and sold wedding dresses, some of which infringed lace patterns in
which Mon Cheri owned copyrights.341 Mon Cheri asked the court to
issue an injunction against further infringements; it also wanted the
infringing dresses in Wu’s possession or under his control impounded.342 The court rejected both requests, regarding the jury
award of $324,000 as having provided Mon Cheri with a meaningful
remedy for the infringement.343 Another consideration was the
impossibility of enjoining the sale of the infringing parts of the
dresses without also enjoining the non-infringing parts.344
2. Balance of Hardships Tipping to Defendants
The balance-of-hardships factor played a key role in denial of a
permanent injunction in Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v.
336. Williams, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *132-40. The court cited the Ninth Circuit’s
Abend decision in support of the ongoing royalty remedy, but not Campbell’s note 10. Id. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the running royalty award without comment. Williams, 895 F.3d at
1130.
337. Williams, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *128-29.
338. Id. at *128-30.
339. Id. at *122-27.
340. No. 04-1739, 2008 WL 4534191, at *3, *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008).
341. Id. at *1.
342. Id. at *6.
343. Id. The court recited the four eBay factors, but did not analyze each. Id.
344. Id.
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Galloway.345 When Phelps sued Galloway for infringing his architectural design, Galloway’s house was only half finished.346 Phelps
initially sought a preliminary injunction to stop further construction
of the infringing house or to require Galloway to modify the design
to avoid infringement, but the trial court denied both requests.347
After winning a jury verdict in its favor, Phelps sought a permanent
injunction against the lease or sale of the infringing house, inspired
perhaps by the pre-eBay Palmetto decision, but the district court
also denied this motion.348
On appeal, Phelps argued that he was entitled to a permanent
injunction because Galloway had so clearly infringed.349 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that eBay foreclosed this argument.350 As for
Phelps’s request to enjoin Galloway from selling or leasing the
infringing house, the court characterized the requested injunction
as “overbroad, as it would encumber a great deal of property unrelated to the infringement,” such as the land on which the house
sat, “the swimming pool, the fence, and other non-infringing features.”351 In addition, the house had “a predominantly functional
character,” beyond the design features protected by copyright.352
While agreeing with Phelps that Galloway would inevitably sell
or otherwise transfer the house before the copyright expired, the
court was unpersuaded that a transfer would infringe.353 Enjoining
the resale or lease of the house, the court declared, would “take on
a fundamentally punitive character” and “impose a draconian
345. 492 F.3d 532, 544 (4th Cir. 2007). After seeing a Phelps-designed house, Galloway
contacted the builder to get a copy of the plans and acted as his own general contractor to
build it. Id. at 535-36. Phelps found out about the infringement because some subcontractors
contacted him for clarification about construction details. Id.
346. Id. at 536.
347. Id. at 542-43. The trial court concluded that “there [was] no likelihood that completion
of the house [would] result in further infringement.” Id. at 542.
348. Id. at 537; see supra text accompanying notes 251-60 (discussing Palmetto).
349. Galloway, 492 F.3d at 537.
350. Id. at 543. However, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for consideration of
Phelps’s request for an injunction requiring Galloway to return the infringing plans to Phelps
or to destroy them. Id. at 546-47.
351. Id. at 545.
352. Id. at 544.
353. Id. (opining that resale of an infringing house is not a distribution of a copy within the
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 106 (citing 1 PATRY, supra note 21, § 3.111)); see supra text accompanying notes 256-60 (discussing Palmetto court’s conclusion that resale or lease of an infringing house would violate an exclusive right under copyright law).
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burden on Galloway, effectively creating a lis pendens on the house
and subjecting him to contempt proceedings simply for selling his
own property.”354
The court concluded that the balance of hardships did not support
issuance of the requested injunction.355 Besides, the $20,000 actual
damage award had “fully and adequately compensated [Phelps] for
the copying and use of its design as manifested in the single Galloway house.”356
3. Public Interest Considerations
Phelps was not the only copyright owner whose effort to permanently enjoin an infringer smacked of vindictiveness. In TD Bank
N.A. v. Hill, the public interest factor loomed large in the Third
Circuit’s decision to reverse a permanent injunction in a “bitter
feud” between a bank and its “rock star” former CEO.357 Years
before, Hill had prepared a book manuscript about his business
philosophy and experience whose copyright he assigned to the
bank.358 After starting another bank, Hill wrote FANS! Not
Customers: How to Create Growth Companies in a No-Growth
World, which included substantial portions of the unpublished
manuscript; Hill made the book available through numerous online
booksellers and publicized it through mass media.359
When TD Bank found out about the new book, it registered its
copyright claim in the manuscript, sent takedown notices to twenty

354. Galloway, 492 F.3d at 544-45 (“Congress manifested an expectation that injunctions
will not be routinely issued against substantially completed houses whose designs violated
architectural copyrights.”).
355. Id. at 544-46.
356. Id. at 544. Strangely enough, the Fourth Circuit stated that Phelps had shown an
inadequate remedy at law and shown irreparable harm. Id. I disagree with both conclusions.
Phelps offered no evidence of irreparable harm from the infringement, and it is inconsistent
with eBay to conclude that violating an exclusive right is, of itself, irreparable injury. There
was, moreover, no likelihood of future infringement by this defendant. See id. at 546. Money
damages sufficed.
357. 928 F.3d 259, 265-66, 284-86 (3d Cir. 2019). Hill was a founder and past CEO of a
bank that merged with TD Bank. Id. at 266-67. For the sake of simplicity, I refer here to the
two banks as one entity.
358. The bank had originally planned to publish the book with Penguin Books, but changed
its mind after it and Hill had a falling-out. Id.
359. Id. Hill copied 16 percent of the manuscript in the new book. Id. at 267.
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retailers, and filed a copyright complaint against Hill.360 The trial
court granted TD Bank’s summary judgment motion on the copyright claim, but initially declined to issue an injunction because TD
Bank failed to show a likelihood of continued infringement.361
However, after Hill recommenced promotion of FANS!, TD Bank
moved for a permanent injunction, which the trial court granted,
concluding that TD Bank had been irreparably injured by being
deprived of its right to withhold the unpublished work from the
public.362
The Third Circuit acknowledged that before eBay, it would have
been appropriate to presume irreparable harm once infringement
had been found.363 However, after eBay, the Third Circuit concluded
that this presumption was no longer sound law364: “[When] considering the propriety of a copyright injunction [courts] should no longer
place a ‘thumb on the scales’ in favor of injunctive relief and inquire
merely whether ‘there is good reason why an injunction should not
issue.’”365
The Third Circuit was unpersuaded by the lower court’s theory of
irreparable harm.366 The bank was, in its view, pursuing an
injunction “not to safeguard the commercial marketability” of the
unpublished manuscript, “but merely to suppress unwelcome
speech.”367 Because TD Bank had no intention of publishing the
manuscript, it had suffered no harm from the infringement.368 An
adequate remedy at law could be had through a reasonable royalty
award or a share of Hill’s profits from sales of FANS!.369
Although the Third Circuit thought that the balance of equities
favored neither party,370 it decided that the public interest factor
weighed heavily against upholding the injunction.371 Hill had a story
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 268.
363. Id. at 279.
364. Id. (citing cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits).
365. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157-58 (2010)).
366. Id. at 282-83.
367. Id. at 284.
368. Id. at 264.
369. Id. at 282.
370. Id. at 284.
371. Id. at 284-86. In support of this proposition, the court cited Campbell’s note 10, the
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to tell, said the court, and people wanted to hear it.372 Hill should
not have to risk being found in contempt by sounding too much like
himself when rewriting the infringing parts.373
The public’s interest in access to infringing copies weighed
heavily in the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou v. Prince.374 The
district court found that Richard Prince had infringed copyrights in
thirty of Patrick Cariou’s photographs by incorporating them in his
appropriation artworks.375 It permanently enjoined further infringement and ordered the infringing works still in the defendant’s
possession to be impounded and destroyed.376 The Second Circuit
concluded that Prince’s fair use defense should prevail as to twentyfive of the thirty works in question and remanded the case for
further proceedings as to the other five works.377 However, the court
directed that
[i]n the event that Prince and Gagosian are ultimately held
liable for copyright infringement, and in light of all parties'
agreement at oral argument that the destruction of Prince's
artwork would be improper and against the public interest, a

Ninth Circuit’s Abend decision, as well as Rosemont and Suntrust. Id. at 285. Relatively few
post-eBay fair use cases cite to Campbell’s note 10 for recognizing that the public interest is
not always served by injunctions. But see Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78, 80-81 (2d Cir.
2010) (citing eBay’s cite to Campbell regarding injunctions and citing Campbell to characterize
the difficulty in assessing the merits of fair use claims at the preliminary stage); Warner Bros.
Ent. Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Campbell on this
point but concluding that defendants had taken too much from plaintiffs’ works and granting
permanent injunction).
372. TD Bank, 928 F.3d at 285. But see Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying preliminary injunction to preserve 5Pointz graffiti art on side of
owner’s building, which plaintiffs alleged should be protected from destruction as works of
recognized stature under 17 U.S.C. § 106A). After the court denied the injunction, G&M
white-washed the building; thereafter, the court ordered a very large statutory damage
award. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d,
950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), as amended (Feb. 21, 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020).
373. See TD Bank, 928 F.3d at 285.
374. 714 F.3d 694, 712 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013).
375. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting Prince’s fair use
defense), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 714 F.3d at 694. The trial court also found
Gagosian Gallery liable for vicarious and contributory infringement because it had publicly
displayed the infringing paintings and prepared an exhibition catalog with reproductions of
Prince’s works. Id. at 354-55.
376. Id. at 355-56.
377. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712.
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position with which we agree, the district court should revisit
what injunctive relief, if any, is appropriate.378

4. Administrability Considerations
Difficulties in fashioning appropriate relief help to explain yet
another decision denying injunctive relief, despite a finding of
indirect copyright infringement, in BMG Rights Management (US)
LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc.379 Cox, an internet access
provider, ignored hundreds of thousands of robotic notices sent by
BMG informing Cox that particular customers were infringing
music copyrights by peer-to-peer filesharing.380 BMG wanted Cox to
send infringement notices to those customers with BMG’s offer to
settle the music copyright claims.381 When Cox refused, BMG sued
it for indirect infringement.382 A jury returned a verdict in BMG’s
favor and awarded it a substantial sum.383 BMG also sought a
permanent injunction directing Cox to refrain from contributing to
further infringements by its users.384 The court denied the requested
injunction as overbroad, vague, and unduly intrusive on Cox’s
business.385
378. Id. at 712 n.5 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), and
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010), but not Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)); see also Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith,
992 F.3d 99, 127 (2d Cir. 2021), as amended, 11 F.4th 26, 54 (2d Cir. 2021) (Jacobs, J.,
concurring) (anticipating that damages would suffice to remedy Warhol’s infringement of
Goldsmith’s derivative work right). Thereafter Cariou and Prince settled. See Randy Kennedy,
Richard Prince Settles Copyright Suit with Patrick Cariou over Photographs, N.Y. TIMES
ARTSBEAT (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:23 PM), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/richardprince-settles-copyright-suit-with-patrick-cariou-over-photographs [https://perma.cc/6A49LXJM].
379. 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 994-95 (E.D. Va. 2016). The Fourth Circuit reversed the liability
ruling in Cox and remanded the case for retrial. See BMG Rts. Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox
Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 315 (4th Cir. 2018). The parties settled prior to retrial, followed
by another, similar suit; after plaintiffs won a $1 billion jury award, Cox again appealed the
liability ruling. See Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Va.
2020), appeal docketed, No. 21-01168 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021).
380. Cox, 199 F. Supp. at 968.
381. Id. at 967-68.
382. Id. at 963.
383. Id. at 969.
384. Id. at 994.
385. Id. at 994-98. Administrability considerations may tip the balance against the grant
of an injunction. See, e.g., Douglas Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite
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D. Post-eBay Cases Denying Preliminary Injunctions
After eBay, preliminary injunctions also became harder to get
because copyright owners could no longer rely on the presumption
of irreparable harm. Courts looked more closely to see if money
damages would suffice. Courts also took seriously a balancing of
hardships, both to the defendant’s business and to third parties. The
public interest factor was less commonly invoked as a basis for
denying a preliminary injunction, but in some cases, this factor
became salient enough to weigh against the requested grant.
1. Failure to Prove Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Legal
Remedies
Post-eBay, it has become relatively common for courts to deny
preliminary injunctions when convinced that damages would be an
adequate remedy or claims of irreparable harm lacked evidentiary
support.386 For example, in Jacobsen v. Katzer, the court was persuaded that a software developer had shown a strong likelihood of
success on the merits of his copyright infringement claim, but the
court nonetheless denied his preliminary injunction motion because
Jacobsen failed to prove he would be irreparably harmed absent an
injunction.387
Jacobsen involved a claim of infringement of model train software
that Jacobsen had made available under an open source license that
included certain restrictions.388 Katzer was the CEO of a company
that incorporated Jacobsen’s software into its commercial product
for an Injunction, 33 FLA. L. REV. 346, 354 (1981).
386. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. William Sagan, Norton, LLC, No. 15 Civ. 4025 (ER),
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60026, at *65-68 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018) (finding compensatory
damages adequate); Joseph Paul Corp. v. Trademark Custom Homes, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-1651L, 2016 WL 4944370, at *15-17 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2016) (finding compensatory damages
adequate); Hoge v. Schmalfeldt, No. 14-1683, 2014 WL 3052489, at *16 (D. Md. July 1, 2014)
(finding compensatory damages adequate); Greene v. Ablon, No. 09-10937, 2013 WL 4714344,
at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2013) (finding compensatory damages adequate); IBM v. BGC
Partners, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 00128 (FM), 2010 WL 1924715, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010)
(finding that plaintiff failed to prove irreparable harm and that damages were an adequate
remedy).
387. 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2009), dismissed, 449 F. App’x 8 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
The facts are related in Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
388. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1380 (quoting the license terms).
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marketed to model railroad enthusiasts.389 Jacobsen claimed that
Katzer’s breach of the open source license was a condition, not a
covenant, of the license, so Katzer’s use of the software infringed
Jacobsen’s copyright.390
Jacobsen appealed the denial of his motion for a preliminary
injunction to the Federal Circuit, which agreed that the license
restrictions were a condition of the grant, breach of which could
result in infringement.391 The Federal Circuit directed the lower
court to presume irreparable harm when reconsidering Jacobsen’s
renewed motion for a preliminary injunction.392
On remand, Jacobsen argued that breach of an open source
license could cause irreparable harm, even if nonmonetary in
character.393 Yet, because the Supreme Court had recently decided
Winter, the district court did not follow the Federal Circuit’s
direction to presume that Katzer’s infringement had caused
irreparable harm.394 It felt bound instead to follow Winter’s renunciation of this presumption. In the court’s view, Jacobsen had proffered only speculation, not proof, that any such harm was likely,
thereby failing to satisfy the Winter standard.395
Despite Fox having shown a likelihood of success on one of its
copyright claims, a court denied its motion for a preliminary
injunction in Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C.396 Fox’s
main claims concerned Dish’s development of a system to enable
389. Id. at 1376.
390. Id. at 1377.
391. Id. at 1380-82.
392. Id. at 1383.
393. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The Federal Circuit
agreed with Katzer’s irreparable harm argument. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376.
394. Jacobsen, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 936. The Federal Circuit signaled that presuming
irreparable harm might need to be rethought in light of eBay, but directed its use in this case,
perhaps because the Ninth Circuit had not yet disavowed the presumption. See Jacobsen, 535
F.3d at 1378.
395. Jacobsen, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 937-38. The court did not address the balance of
hardships or public interest factors. Despite this preliminary injunction denial, Jacobsen
negotiated a favorable settlement with Katzer under which Katzer agreed to refrain from
reproducing, modifying, or distributing the software and to pay Jacobsen $100,000 plus costs
and attorney fees. Joint Administrative Motion Regarding Settlement, Jacobsen v. Katzer,
609 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C06-1905).
396. 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth
Circuit denied Fox’s petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc. Fox Broad Co. v. Dish
Network, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2014).
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customers to build home-taped libraries of prime-time television
programs and to use Dish’s tool to skip commercial ads in the taped
programs.397 Fox claimed this system infringed copyrights and
breached contracts authorizing Dish, the third largest subscription
TV provider, to disseminate Fox programming.398 The district court
decided that because Dish’s customers, not Dish, made the copies,
the home-taping was fair use, so Dish was neither directly nor
indirectly liable on this claim.399 As for commercial skipping, the
court found that the quality assurance copies that Dish staff prepared for the purpose of testing when to skip commercials were
likely infringing.400 However, the court decided that Fox failed to
show those copies were irreparably harming it.401 The court thought
that a damage award would be more appropriate for this copying; it
regarded the dispute between Fox and Dish as mainly contractual
in nature.402 The Ninth Circuit decided that the district court had
not abused its discretion in denying the requested injunction.403
The adequacy of legal remedies likewise doomed a photographer’s
motion for a preliminary injunction in Frerck v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.404 Frerck had licensed Wiley to use his photographs in Wiley
textbooks; each license defined the number of permissible copies,
image size, distribution area, form of media, and duration for each
book.405 Frerck claimed that Wiley's uses exceeded the number
permitted by the licenses and that Wiley had used some photographs without seeking permission.406 The court opined that Frerck
had a “significant chance” of prevailing on the merits of his
claims.407 However, it was unconvinced by Frerck’s argument that
397. Fox, 747 F.3d at 1064-65.
398. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1093, 1096.
399. Id. at 1098, 1102.
400. Id. at 1104-06.
401. Id. Because Fox did not own copyrights in the commercials, it could not claim
infringement based on the commercial skipping functionality.
402. Id. at 1110-11.
403. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 747 F.3d 1060, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2014).
404. 850 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Courts denied similar motions in Grant
Heilman Photography, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D. Pa. 2012);
Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1416, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115835
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).
405. Frerck, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 892-93.
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he would suffer irreparable harm unless an injunction issued even
if Wiley would likely continue to infringe these copyrights in the
future.408 The court held that Frerck failed to show that the harm
from Wiley’s infringement could not be fully redressed through an
award of money damages.409
2. Balance of Hardships: Considering the Effects of an
Injunction on the Defendant’s Business or Third Parties
In several post-eBay cases, courts decided against issuing
preliminary injunctions mainly because the injunction requested
would have harmful effects on the defendants’ businesses or on
third parties.410 Before eBay, courts rarely took into account the
impact of a preliminary injunction on the defendant’s ability to
carry on its business except when a plaintiff ’s delay in suing or
moving for injunctive relief had led the defendant to make significant investments in commercializing the work alleged to infringe.411
Softech Worldwide, LLC v. Internet Technology Broadcasting
Corp. was a post-eBay case that withheld a preliminary injunction
because of its likely effects on third parties.412 Softech had subcontracted with Internet Technology Broadcasting Corp. (ITBC) to
develop software for a project that ITBC had undertaken for the
Veterans Administration (VA) to assist in electronic distribution of

408. Id. at 894.
409. Id. at 893-94.
410. See, e.g., Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1416, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115835, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011) (finding injunction might harm students using
textbooks in which infringing photographs appeared); Auto Inspection Servs., Inc. v. Flint
Auto Auction, Inc., No. 06-15100, 2006 WL 3500868, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2006) (denying
preliminary injunction because it would be “disastrous” to the defendant’s business); see also
SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 387-88 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming
denial of permanent injunction in copyright and contract case because of likely “ruinous”
effects on WPL’s business); HarperCollins Publishers LLC v. Open Road Integrated Media,
LLP, 58 F. Supp. 3d 380, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (affirming injunction against an infringing
publisher of ebooks, but narrowing the scope of the injunction so as not to “impose
unnecessary burdens on lawful activity”); Gilden, supra note 318, at 1170-71 (discussing case
in which tattoo artist was likely to succeed on the merits for Warner’s unlicensed use of his
tattoos in movie, but denying preliminary injunction because of hardship to Warner).
411. See, e.g., New Era III, 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989); see also supra text
accompanying note 125 (discussing New Era’s delay in bringing suit).
412. 761 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2011).
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materials to VA staff.413 After a falling-out between the parties,
ITBC continued to maintain the software for the VA over Softech’s
objection.414 Noting that ITBC had raised plausible defenses,415 the
court denied the injunction, perceiving no irreparable harm because
the software at issue was not for sale on the open market, so there
was no risk of further infringement.416 ITBC’s work “in servicing the
software in this case [was] essential to that software’s useful
functioning for the VA,” and “the VA would suffer harm to its
software infrastructure” if the court issued the injunction.417 The
court was persuaded that a damages award would be an adequate
remedy if Softech eventually prevailed.418
Harm to the defendant’s business also factored into a denial of
injunctive relief in Allora, LLC v. Brownstone, Inc.419 Allora, an
architect, sued Brownstone for infringement after the developer
breached geographic license restrictions on where it could build
three houses of Allora’s design.420 Upon learning of this breach,
Allora revoked the licenses and insisted that Brownstone cease
construction of the infringing houses.421 When the court heard
Allora’s motion for preliminary injunction, the three houses were,
respectively, 95 percent, 60 percent, and 30 percent complete.422 The
court concluded that allowing Brownstone to complete construction
would cause only “very slight” harm to Allora, but an injunction
would cause “massive damage” to Brownstone.423 An injunction
would also “destroy [its] reputation[ ] with financial institutions”
and with its subcontractors who “would be deprived of their means
to make a living.”424 The neighborhood would, moreover, be “left
413. Id. at 370-71.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 375-76. Softech had been paid $3.3 million for developing this software. Id. at
373.
416. Id. at 377.
417. Id.; see also Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 993 (9th
Cir. 2011) (denying injunction against defendant’s continued use of accused drawings so it
could perform responsibilities under government contract).
418. Softech, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
419. No. 1:07CV87, 2007 WL 1246448 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2007).
420. Id. at *1-2.
421. Id.
422. Id. at *8.
423. Id. at *7.
424. Id. at *7-8.
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with the unpleasant site and potential hazards associated with
incomplete construction projects for an undetermined and likely
lengthy amount of time.”425 As in Softech, the court thought a
damage award would address harm to the uniqueness of Allora’s
designs.426
Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. v. uCool, Inc. was much less
convincing than Allora of the post-eBay cases withholding preliminary injunctive relief because of the effects on a defendant’s
business.427 Lilith claimed that uCool had copied source code and
some nonliteral elements of its videogame as well as having
misappropriated trade secrets.428 Despite being persuaded that
Lilith had shown likely success on the merits, the court denied its
preliminary injunction motion.429 By the time Lilith sued, uCool’s
game had become very popular in the United States, and some users
posted comments online suggesting that Lilith must have copied
uCool’s game because the two firms’ games were so similar.430
Having been unable to make a deal with an exclusive distributor
because uCool’s game was already established in the U.S. market,
Lilith argued it had been irreparably harmed by uCool’s infringement.431 But the court concluded that Lilith had failed to show
irreparable harm because its game did not have a reputation in the
United States.432 The court noted that granting Lilith’s motion
would mean that “uCool would be forced to take down its most
popular game, threatening uCool’s viability as a company.”433
Protecting an American business that has likely infringed copyrights and misappropriated trade secrets seems wrong.434
425. Id. at *8.
426. Id.
427. See No. 15-CV-01267, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128619 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015).
428. Id. at *4.
429. Id. at *38-39.
430. Id. at *3-4.
431. Id.
432. Id. at *33-44.
433. Id. at *34. The court said that this would irreparably harm uCool and result in a
significant loss of goodwill. Id. at *35.
434. The court asserted that Lilith’s delay in filing suit was another reason for denying the
injunction. Id. at *35-36. Another court might have been more tolerant of the delay given that
Lilith was a startup company just trying to enter the U.S. market and was worried about the
high costs of litigation; it had made an effort to negotiate with uCool and to make a deal with
an exclusive distributor. Id. at *3-4.
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3. Considering the Public Interest in Close Cases
The public interest has played a less significant role in the posteBay preliminary injunction case law than one might have
expected.435 The D.C. Circuit may have implicitly heeded this factor
when it vacated a district court’s grant of partial summary judgment and a takedown injunction in an important, close post-eBay
access-to-information case, American Society for Testing & Materials, Inc. v. Public.Resource.org, Inc.436
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) and five
other standard-setting organizations sued Public.Resource for
infringement because it posted their copyrighted technical standards for a wide variety of fields, such as building, product safety,
energy efficiency, and educational testing, on its website.437
Public.Resource challenged the validity of the plaintiffs’ copyright
claims, arguing that once legislatures incorporated the standards by
reference into laws, the standards were no longer copyrightprotectable because no one can own the law and the public has a
right to free access to the laws that govern them.438 Alternatively,
435. But see White v. Alcon Film Fund, LLC, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (denying
injunctive relief in case alleging film infringed book copyright because of public interest in
competition); Molinelli-Freytes v. Univ. of P.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 150, 163 (D.P.R. 2010)
(denying preliminary injunction because the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s work advanced
scientific research). It is common for courts to assert that the public interest is best served by
enforcing copyrights. See, e.g., Klitzner Indus., Inc. v. H. K. James & Co., 535 F. Supp. 1249,
1259-60 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“[I]t is virtually axiomatic that the public interest can only be served
by upholding copyright protections.”). Even after eBay, courts sometimes express similar
sentiments. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Ent., Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1015
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that “it is virtually axiomatic” that preliminary injunction would
serve the public interest); see also 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 13.1.2 (quoting Klitzner and
explaining that “where the probability of success is high, temporary relief is required to
protect the integrity of the copyright law and of investments made in reliance on the copyright
law”). But see 6 PATRY, supra note 21, § 22:64 (criticizing Klitzner dicta).
436. 896 F.3d 437, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly
of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018) (vacating injunction
against online posting of Official Code of Georgia Annotated because the annotations were
closely intertwined with the statutes and approved by the Georgia legislature), aff’d sub nom.
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
437. Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 441, 444.
438. Id. at 446-47. The D.C. Circuit declined to rule on Public.Resource’s challenge to the
copyrightability of codes adopted as laws. Id. at 447. On remand, the district court in ASTM
will have to consider the implications of the Court’s uncopyrightability-of-law ruling in
Georgia.

838

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:773

Public.Resource claimed that its posting of the ASTM incorporatedstandards-as-laws was fair use.439 The district court was unpersuaded by these defenses and permanently enjoined Public.Resource
from all unauthorized use of the standards.440
The D.C. Circuit ordered the district court to reconsider Public.Resource’s fair use defense in keeping with its more favorable
analysis of the fair use factors.441 Although the circuit court invoked
the Campbell decision in its substantive analysis of fair use,442 it did
not cite to eBay, Campbell, or Tasini in ruling that the lower court
had erred in issuing the injunction.443
E. Injunctions Remain Common in “Simple Piracy” Cases
In the post-eBay period, courts have generally issued injunctions
in what Judge Leval once termed “simple piracy” cases.444 Injunctions have, for instance, frequently issued against defendants who
have engaged in or facilitated infringements through file-sharing
or BitTorrent sites.445 Courts have also enjoined other types of online distributions of infringing copies of textbooks, photographs, and
movies.446 Literal infringement of software copyrights has generally
439. Id. at 446.
440. Id. at 444-45.
441. Id. at 458.
442. Id. at 452-53.
443. Id. at 458.
444. Recall that Campbell endorsed Judge Leval’s statement that courts should presume
irreparable harm in simple piracy cases. See supra note 184. However, eBay and Winter have
seemingly overridden that presumption in all injunction cases.
445. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013)
(facilitating BitTorrent infringements); Malibu Media, LLC v. Flanagan, No. 2:13-CV-5890,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89224 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2014) (BitTorrent infringement); Patrick
Collins, Inc. v. Gillespie, No. 11-cv-01776, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25755 (S.D. Ma. Feb. 22,
2012) (BitTorrent infringement). But see Cell Film Holdings LLC v. Acosta, No. 2:16-CV01853-VCF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 (D. Nev. Nov. 29, 2017) (concluding that damages
would suffice as a remedy). Injunctions are also commonly granted in default judgment cases.
See, e.g., Getty Images (US), Inc. v. Virtual Clinics, No. C13-0626, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37611 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2014) (enjoining infringement of Getty photographs on defendant’s website).
446. See, e.g., Comerica Bank & Tr. NA v. Habib, 433 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D. Mass. 2020)
(enjoining upload of Prince concert videos); Elsevier, Inc. v. Stew Yee Chew, No. 17 Civ. 6225
(JGK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019) (enjoining distribution of counterfeit
textbooks); Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., No. CV 05-3699-PHX, 2008 WL
4174882 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008) (enjoining online posting of photographs).
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resulted in injunctive relief.447 The collective rights management
organization, Broadcast Music Inc., was often able to obtain injunctions to restrain bars and other establishments from unlicensed
public performances of music from its repertoire.448 Unlicensed performance of music in karaoke bars has similarly been enjoined in
the post-eBay period.449
Courts in several post-eBay cases granted injunctions to stop
technology companies from engaging in what they perceived to be
“simple piracy.”450 Several cases involved services engaged in unlicensed transmissions of broadcast television programs over the
internet.451 Also enjoined was a defendant’s distribution of an app
enabling users to gain unauthorized access to cable television programs.452 A movie studio got a preliminary injunction against an
online videostreaming service that aimed to make movies more

447. See, e.g., QueTel Corp. v. Abbas, 819 F. App’x 154 (4th Cir. 2020) (enjoining source
code copying in competing product); Microsoft Corp. v. Matrurano, No. 1:06cv1747 OWW, 2009
WL 1530040 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2009); see also Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 3d 1157 (D. Nev. 2018) (granting permanent injunction after jury verdict), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018) (vacating injunction and remanding for
reconsideration to address eBay factors), rev’d in part on other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019).
448. See, e.g., Broad. Music Inc. v. Blk, III LLC, No. CV-19-01358-PHX, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83266 (D. Ariz. May 12, 2020). But see Broad. Music, Inc. v. PAMDH Enters., No. 13CV-2255, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84409 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2014) (concluding that money
damages sufficed).
449. See, e.g., Elohim EFP USA, Inc. v. Aceplus, Inc., No. CV 14-05428 (EX), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 194240 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2015).
450. See supra note 184.
451. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.
2013) (issuing preliminary injunction against unlicensed internet retransmission of television
programs); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d
1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (issuing a preliminary injunction). These defendants were emboldened
by Aereo’s early success in fending off a preliminary injunction for such transmissions. See
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. WNET,
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo,
Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (holding that Aereo’s system of transmitting broadcast TV programs
to customers’ internet-connected devices infringed public performance rights in the
programming; remanded for further proceedings). The district court in Aereo thoroughly
reviewed the eBay factors in explaining why it denied the preliminary injunction. See Aereo,
874 F. Supp. 2d at 381-405. Upon remand from the Court’s decision, the district court enjoined
Aereo from continuing to provide this service. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., Nos. 12-cv-1540,
12-cv-1543, 2014 WL 5393867, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014).
452. See China Cent. TV v. Create New Tech. (HK) Ltd., No. CV 15-01869 (AJWx), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189052 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2015).
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family friendly by modifying their contents after making master
copies of movies “ripped” from DVDs and BluRay disks.453
When presented with novel questions of copyright law, courts
may initially be reluctant to issue preliminary injunctions, even
though permanent injunctions are likely if the novel questions are
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, as in Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi, Inc.454 The novel question in ReDigi was whether that firm’s
platform that allowed owners of copies of digital music to “resell”
their copies to others was sheltered by the first sale rule or a fair
use defense.455 The district court ruled that neither defense was
persuasive; yet, it denied Capitol Records’ request for a preliminary
injunction.456 After the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court
finding of copyright infringement, ReDigi was enjoined from further
operation of its platform.457
Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc. posed another novel fair
use question as to whether TVEyes infringed by making clips of
Fox News programs searchable and downloadable by its customers.458 The Second Circuit reversed a lower court’s ruling that
some of the watch functionality of the TVEyes news clipping service
was fair use and directed that court to issue an injunction to
restrain the watch-related functionality that TVEyes had enabled
of clips of Fox News programming, which the court concluded
infringed Fox’s copyrights.459
F. No Preliminary Injunction to Protect Non-Copyright Interests
The longstanding pre-eBay presumption of irreparable harm once
plaintiffs showed actual or likely infringement has meant that
453. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
454. 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).
455. Id. at 652.
456. The trial court denied Capitol Records’ motion for a preliminary injunction despite the
likelihood of success on the merits because of Colting and eBay. See Gilden, supra note 318,
at 1171-72 (reporting on ReDigi preliminary injunction decision).
457. ReDigi, 910 F.3d at 655, 664. ReDigi filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the
Supreme Court denied. ReDigi Inc. v. Capitol Records, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 2760 (2019).
458. 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018).
459. Id. at 181-82. Fox did not contest the legality of what the Second Circuit characterized
as TVEyes’s search functionality. Id. at 182. TVEyes is still in business as a search engine for
broadcast news programming. Welcome to TVEyes., TVEYES, https://tveyes.com/about-us-2/
[https://perma.cc/84UW-A3V8].
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courts in copyright cases rarely analyzed or reflected on whether the
harms being enjoined were of the sort that copyright law was designed to protect against.460 Post-eBay, courts have had to be more
thoughtful about the kinds of harms that justify issuance of
injunctions.461 When plaintiffs ask for an injunction to vindicate
non-copyright harms, courts have denied injunctive relief.
The most prominent decision of this sort was Garcia v. Google,
Inc., in which a Ninth Circuit en banc panel reversed an earlier
panel ruling that would have ordered Google to take down the
“Innocence of the Muslims” video, which Garcia claimed infringed
a copyright interest that she had in her performance in the video.462
The first panel agreed with Garcia that she had an independently
copyright-protectable interest in her performance, which had been
infringed by the video producer’s alteration of the performance and
use beyond the implied license granted when she acted in the video.463 The first panel found persuasive Garcia’s plea for an injunction because she was suffering irreparable harm as the recipient of
multiple death threats arising from her unwitting performance as
part of an anti-Muslim video that had caused outrage and violence
in the Middle East.464

460. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (presuming
irreparable harm with scant discussion and granting preliminary injunction).
461. It is far from uncommon for copyright claims to be asserted in an effort to vindicate
non-copyright interests. See, e.g., Cathay Y.N. Smith, Weaponizing Copyright, 35 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 193 (2021) (identifying five common non-copyright objectives when bringing such
suits: “to silence and erase facts, suppress criticism and speech, punish and retaliate, protect
reputation and moral rights, and preserve privacy”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the
Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549 (2015)
(expressing concern about attempted exercises of IP rights to vindicate non-IP objectives); Eric
Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU L. REV. 929.
462. 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), rev’g 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014); see also
supra texts accompanying notes 345-73 (discussing Galloway and TD Bank, in which plaintiffs
wanted injunctive relief to wreak vengeance rather than to vindicate copyright interests).
Consumers Union was an early example of this kind of unsuccessful claim. See supra text
accompanying notes 30-35.
463. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 933-38 (9th Cir. 2014).
464. Id. at 932, 938-40. A majority of the panel thought all four eBay and Winter factors
tipped in favor of the injunction. Id. at 940. One judge was unpersuaded that Garcia had a
copyright interest in her performance or that the eBay and Winter factors favored issuance
of an injunction. Id. at 940-49 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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The en banc Garcia decision is mostly known for its ruling that
Garcia did not have a copyright-protectable interest in her performance after it was integrated into the video.465 But it also ruled that
courts should only issue injunctions when plaintiffs have shown
irreparable harms to their authorial copyright interests.466 Although
the en banc court did not “take lightly threats to life or the emotional turmoil Garcia has endured, her harms are untethered
from—and incompatible with—copyright and copyright’s function as
the engine of expression.”467
While the en banc panel could have reversed on this basis alone,
it characterized the earlier panel decision’s takedown order as
“unwarranted and incorrect as a matter of law” and objectionable
because it “gave short shrift to the First Amendment values at
stake,” for the injunction “censored and suppressed a politically
significant film—based upon a dubious and unprecedented theory
of copyright.”468 In so doing, the earlier decision “deprived the public
of the ability to view firsthand, and judge for themselves, a film at
the center of an international uproar.”469 Garcia shows that
suppressing lawful speech is not the proper role for copyright law,
even when that speech is offensive.
Another case in which a plaintiff sought an injunction to address
non-copyright harms was Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC.470 Widely
known as the professional wrestler Hulk Hogan, Bollea sued
Gawker Media for copyright infringement because it published a
video of him having sex with a woman who was not his wife.471 He
465. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740-44. The en banc court likened Garcia’s theory that her
performance was independently copyrightable to “‘copyright cherry picking,’ which would
enable any contributor from a costume designer down to an extra or best boy to claim
copyright in random bits and pieces of a unitary motion picture without satisfying the
requirements of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 737.
466. Id. at 745.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 746-47.
469. Id. at 747. The en banc panel called the takedown order “a ... prior restraint of speech.”
Id.
470. 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012); see also Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556
F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Lennon’s heirs objected to Premise’s use of fifteen seconds
of Lennon’s song, including the lyric “[a]nd no religion too,” juxtaposed with a photo of Stalin,
in a documentary critiquing scientists for skepticism about creationism. Lennon, 556 F. Supp.
2d at 316-17.
471. Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1326-27. Bollea acquired the copyright from the
videographer. Id. at 1327.
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sought a preliminary injunction against Gawker Media’s further use
of the video, claiming that he was irreparably harmed by Gawker’s
publication.472
Even if Bollea could establish a likelihood of success on the merits
and even if the balance of hardships tipped in his favor, the court
decided that no injunction should issue, for Bollea had “produced no
evidence demonstrating that he [would] suffer irreparable harm in
the copyright sense absent a preliminary injunction.”473 Any harm
to his professional image or to him personally was due only “to the
‘private’ nature of the Video’s content,” which did not “constitute
irreparable harm in the context of copyright infringement.”474
Bollea’s copyright claim was “nothing more than a belated attempt
to bolster his previous claims based on the common-law right to
privacy.”475
IV. REFLECTIONS ON EBAY AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
Having canvassed the case law on denials of injunctive relief in
three different periods—before Campbell, from Campbell to eBay,
and post-eBay—the Article turns now to considering, first, whether
the post-eBay copyright case law is consistent with traditional
principles of equity, and second, why eBay seems not to have opened
the floodgates to damages-only remedies for copyright infringement.
Section A suggests that even if eBay’s critics are right that the
Court deviated from certain traditional principles of equity, courts
in the post-eBay copyright infringement cases have only rarely been
led astray because of these mistakes. If anything, the eBay decision
has had corrective effects on how courts in copyright cases assess
whether to issue injunctions. Section B discusses several reasons
472. Id. at 1326-27.
473. Id. at 1329. The court thought that none of the eBay factors favored Bollea, in part
because he had no intention of commercializing the video. Id. at 1328-31.
474. Id. at 1329 (footnote omitted). The court quoted from Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68,
81 (2d Cir. 2010), and from Judge Leval’s decision in New Era II, 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1526
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), for the proposition that copyright protects authorial commercial interests and
should not be exercised “to coddle artistic vanity or to protect secrecy.” Id. at 1329-30.
475. Id. at 1330. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (large damage award for invasion of Bollea’s privacy); Nick Madigan & Ravi Somaiya,
Hulk Hogan Awarded $115 Million in Privacy Suit Against Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-verdict.html
[https://perma.cc/3KF8-NJ7E].
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why courts are still reluctant to withhold injunctive relief when
infringement has been found or found to be likely, eBay and its
progeny notwithstanding.
A. Effects of eBay’s Departure from Traditional Equitable
Principles
Private law and remedies scholars have heavily criticized the
eBay decision for what they charge are its numerous departures
from traditional principles of equity when considering whether to
issue injunctions.476 One article criticized eBay for having “swept
aside long-settled presumptions about when injunctions should
issue,” presumptions that courts have long used to “structure or
streamline” injunction analyses.477 Especially criticized has been
eBay’s rejection of a presumption of irreparable harm when IP
rights have been infringed.478
The presumption of irreparable harm has traditionally performed
a useful burden-shifting function.479 Once plaintiffs showed that
their rights had been or were likely infringed, this presumption
476. See, e.g., Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 207-08; see also Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory
Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move
the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 792-93 (2012) (giving eBay as an example of how the Supreme
Court has inadvertently effected a change in the legal standard for issuance of injunctions);
Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 168 (2008)
(deeming eBay “a spectacular example of the confusion that can result from litigating a
remedies issue without a remedies specialist”); Doug Rendleman, Remedies: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 57 ST. LOUIS L.J. 567, 582 (2013) (characterizing eBay as a “judicial blunder[ ]”);
Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1027, 1034 (2011) (describing eBay as a “move backward[ ]”). See generally Doug Rendleman,
The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63
(2007); Tracy Thomas, eBay Rx, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 187 (2008). But see Samuel L. Bray,
The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1025-26 (2015) (explaining
that each part of the eBay test has “deep roots in the history of equity”).
477. Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 205, 212. But see Bray, supra note 476, at 1043
(“Although [cases such as eBay] can easily be read as absolutely rejecting any presumptions
about equitable remedies, a narrower reading is also plausible. The Court could be understood
as insisting that lower courts resist any presumptions that would make the injunction
decision effectively automatic.”); McGowan, supra note 312, at 582 (“Rebuttable presumptions
economize on litigation costs by economizing on information costs.”).
478. Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 212.
479. But see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4-5 (1991)
(casting doubt on the meaningfulness of the irreparable harm rule that courts frequently
invoke but evade).
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shifted the burden onto defendants to offer rebuttal evidence.480 The
Campbell decision is more compatible with these principles than
eBay in its assertion that a presumption of irreparable injury is
sound in “simple piracy” cases.481 Although courts continued to
support this presumption in the first several years after eBay, the
predominant view now is that eBay overturned that presumption,
as Part III.B showed.
However sound this criticism may be, eBay’s repudiation of this
presumption has had largely salutary effects in copyright cases
because courts prior to eBay had treated the presumption as though
it was virtually irrebuttable.482 It was akin to the Federal Circuit’s
categorical pro-injunction rule in patent cases that the Court overturned in eBay.483 Courts in copyright cases are now more willing to
make a meaningful assessment about what harms have resulted
from the infringement, whether they can be remedied through monetary relief, and whether future infringements are likely before
deciding whether the irreparable harm evidence favors or disfavors
injunctive relief.484 During the period in which the hard presumption prevailed, courts had no need to articulate what kinds of harms
from copyright infringement were irreparable and why.485 The
demise of that presumption has meant that courts have had to start
explaining why some harms are indeed irreparable.486
A second criticism of eBay concerns its separation of irreparable
injury and inadequacy of legal remedies as two factors when in
equity, these considerations have traditionally been considered two

480. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining the traditional rule for burden shifting).
481. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval,
supra note 145, at 1132).
482. See 6 PATRY, supra note 21, § 22:1 (“[I]n the lower courts injunctions [in copyright
cases] are too often handed out as freely as swag at a celebrity event.”).
483. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86.
484. See supra Part III.C-D.
485. See supra text accompanying note 460.
486. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting harm may be
irreparable “for many reasons, including that [such] a loss is difficult to replace or difficult to
measure or that it is a loss that one should not be expected to suffer”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210-19 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (extensively
discussing irreparable harm standard in copyright cases); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15,
§ 13.1.2.2 (discussing circumstances demonstrating irreparable harm in copyright cases);
McGowan, supra note 312, at 587-95 (discussing the same).
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elements of the same inquiry.487 Even though Winter’s four-factor
test for preliminary injunctive relief dropped inadequacy of legal
remedies as a separate factor,488 courts in copyright cases have
generally continued to treat the inadequate legal remedies factor as
distinct from the irreparable harm factor.489
Criticizing eBay for treating irreparable harm and inadequate
legal remedies as separate factors may also be sound. However, the
eBay Court’s insistence on separating them has had positive effects
in copyright cases because courts have been much more willing to
think carefully about whether monetary relief would suffice.490 In
the past decade, it has consequently become more common for
courts to withhold injunctions because of the adequacy of legal
remedies.491
A third cluster of criticisms has been that eBay does not acknowledge equitable defenses, such as unclean hands, laches, and estoppel, which have historically been important considerations when
courts decide whether to issue injunctions.492 There is, moreover, no
place in the eBay framework for a related set of equitable principles
that guard against “anti-opportunism; not using an injunction as a
tool of oppression; preventing repetitive, continuous, or threatened
harm; preventing repeat litigation; and protecting the court’s ability
to adjudicate.”493 The eBay four-factor test also ignores consideration
of the good or bad faith of an infringer, which has historically
influenced judicial decisions about injunctive relief and shifts the

487. Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 209 (characterizing the first and second factors as
“redundant”).
488. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
489. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (listing cases).
490. Professor Rendleman has observed that a compensatory award is “a cleaner, more
impersonal remedy to enforce” as compared to injunctions. Rendleman, supra note 385, at
356-57.
491. See supra Part III.C.1, D.1. The “rough consensus” among remedies scholars prior to
eBay had been that the no-adequate-remedy-at-law requirement was “outdated” and that “the
distinction between legal and equitable remedies is disappearing and should disappear.” Bray,
supra note 476, at 1006, 1008 (emphasis omitted). The Court revived the importance of this
requirement in eBay. Id. at 1004. Bray asserts that “on the whole, the Court has constructed
an idealized history of equity that is well suited to judicial decisionmaking” that is “largely
consistent with traditional equitable principles.” Id. at 1001.
492. Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 208.
493. Id. at 233.
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burden on the public interest factor to plaintiffs when that burden
was conventionally on defendants.494
As valid as these criticisms may be, courts have taken these
equitable defenses and principles seriously in the last decade of
post-eBay copyright cases, even though they do not fit within the
eBay test framework. Numerous cases refused to issue injunctions
on laches and other equitable grounds.495 The Fourth Circuit
rejected Phelps’s requested injunction to forbid Galloway from
reselling or leasing the infringing house because, among other
things, doing so would be punitive, not equitable.496 The Third
Circuit’s TD Bank decision likewise found the bank’s request for
injunctive relief to be oppressive.497 In some cases, courts have declined to enjoin defendants whom they regarded as innocent.498 Also
attentive to equitable principles have been cases that considered
negative impacts of injunctive relief on innocent third parties.499
Lilith is the one post-eBay copyright case that failed to conform
to traditional equitable principles.500 The court was persuaded that
Lilith had shown a likelihood that uCool’s copying of source code
and elements of Lilith’s user interface violated Lilith’s videogame
copyright.501 Under traditional equitable principles, the court should
have presumed irreparable harm in this “simple piracy” case and
put the burden on uCool to offer rebuttal evidence.502 The burden
would have been difficult to meet because Lilith also showed that

494. Id. at 239 (“[I]njunctions tend to be particularly appropriate for bad-faith violators—in
the sense of violators with notice—but a distinction between good-faith and bad-faith
violations seems at least facially orthogonal to the eBay test.”); Hasen, supra note 476, at 794
(stating that the burden conventionally on defendants to show public interest is not disserved
by injunction).
495. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
496. See supra Part III.C.2.
497. See supra Part III.C.3.
498. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hill, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-230, 2017 WL 10398725, at *7
(E.D. Tenn. July 17, 2017). Moreover, when a defendant voluntarily ceased the objectionable
conduct after the plaintiff complained, the court found no need for an injunction. See Getty
Images (US), Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
499. See, e.g., supra Part III.D.2 (discussing Softech).
500. See Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. v. uCool, Inc., No. 15-CV-01267, 2015 WL 5591612
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015).
501. Id. at *4.
502. Id. at *2.
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this infringement had interfered with its ability to negotiate an
exclusive contract with a U.S. distributor.503
Critics have also faulted eBay for “operat[ing] as a doctrinal
straitjacket of a sort that courts sitting in equity have commonly
resisted.”504 These critics have pointed to language in eBay suggesting that eBay’s four factors are prongs, such that a plaintiff’s failure
of proof as to any one factor would doom the plaintiff’s motion for
injunctive relief instead of weighing the factors together in a holistic
way.505 Courts in the post-eBay copyright case law have, however,
treated the factors as a balancing test.506 In Galloway and TD Bank,
for example, some factors supported injunctive relief, while others
disfavored it.507
B. Why Don’t Courts Withhold Injunctions More Often in
Copyright Cases?
For decades, legal commentators have endorsed the idea that
courts should sometimes deny requested injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases.508 The Supreme Court’s endorsement of
this option in Campbell, Tasini, and eBay has seemingly made this
idea more salient. As Part III has shown, courts in the past decade
have indeed become more willing to award damages instead of
almost always ordering injunctions.509
503. See supra text accompanying note 431.
504. Gergen et al., supra note 1, at 211.
505. Id. at 208, 213.
506. See supra note 410 and accompanying text (listing cases). Pre-eBay architecture cases
also nicely illustrate this. See supra Part II.C. But see Splitfish AG v. Bannco Corp., 727 F.
Supp. 2d 461, 465-69 (E.D. Va. 2010) (interpreting Winter and a subsequent Fourth Circuit
decision as requiring plaintiffs to satisfy all four steps of the eBay test, although finding that
Splitfish had done so and granting a preliminary injunction).
507. See supra notes 345-73 and accompanying text.
508. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 145, at 1131 (citing older sources). For more contemporary
examples, see, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for Change,
55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 165 (2008); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-butPaid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383 (2014); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s
So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 513, 525-26 (1999); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002); John
Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201; Jacob Victor, Utility-Expanding Fair Use, 105 MINN.
L. REV. 1887 (2021).
509. See, e.g., Ronald T. Coleman Jr., Trishanda L. Treadwell & Elizabeth A. Loyd,
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The most common fact patterns in the injunction denial cases
have concerned disputes in which the litigants had a falling-out
during a contractual or other relationship,510 in which the infringing
element was a small part of a larger work and the defendant made
substantial investments in the overall project,511 in which the
claimed irreparable harm was for injuries not cognizable in copyright cases,512 and in which courts took into account the hardships
an injunction would impose on third parties or the defendant.513
Much rarer have been injunction denials in close fair use cases and
other cases in which courts were persuaded that the public interest
would be served by allowing public access to the infringing works.514
Courts occasionally invoke the First Amendment as a consideration
in whether injunctions should issue.515

Applicability of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 9
(2012) (“eBay also has made a difference by serving to remind lower courts that injunctive
relief is truly an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when money damages
cannot make the plaintiff whole. This renewed focus is particularly important at the
preliminary injunction stage, where many intellectual property cases are won or lost as a
practical matter.”).
510. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999);
Softech Worldwide, LLC v. Internet Tech. Broad. Corp., 761 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2011);
see supra notes 261-70, 412-18 and accompanying text.
511. See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988); Frerck v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see supra text accompanying notes 45-60, 40409. Injunctions are also less common in “thin” copyright cases. See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen’s
Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908); Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 84
(2d Cir. 2004) (“[A]ny protectible interest Silverstein may have [in his compilation] would be
so slight that it cannot properly be enforced by a preliminary or permanent injunction.”).
512. See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), rev’g 766 F.3d
929 (9th Cir. 2014); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); see supra notes 30-35, 463-70 and accompanying text.
513. See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007);
Balsamo/Olson Grp., Ltd. v. Bradley Place L.P., 966 F. Supp. 757 (C.D. Ill. 1996); see supra
notes 237-43, 345-56 and accompanying text.
514. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013); Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2001); see supra notes 187-203, 374-78 and accompanying text.
515. See, e.g., Garcia, 786 F.3d at 747; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d
1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), vacating as moot, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2001); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966). See supra
notes 85, 193, 469 and accompanying text. It is interesting that Judge Leval invoked the First
Amendment in support of withholding an injunction in New Era II, but grounded his article’s
parallel proposition in the constitutional purpose of copyright law. Leval, supra note 145, at
1134-35; see supra text accompanying notes 114-18, 158-59.
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Nonetheless, it is worth speculating about why courts in copyright
cases do not order damages instead of injunctions more frequently.
After all, Colting and Flexible recognized that Winter spoke of
injunctive relief as an “extraordinary remedy” and put significant
burdens on plaintiffs to make “clear showing[s]” that injunctive
relief was warranted.516 As Professor Bray has pointed out, these
statements should not be taken to indicate that injunctive relief is
or should be “rare or unusual,”517 but rather that injunctions are
“departure[s] from the norm” that legal remedies are generally
adequate to rectify wrongs.518
Even so, compensatory remedies may be inadequate for a host of
reasons, which is why injured parties often seek relief in equity with
its power to order a wrongdoer to act or cease acting to prevent
irreparable harm.519 Harm may, for instance, be irreparable when
the copyright owner does not have an existing licensing market for
uses such as those the infringer has exploited.520 The owner may
also simply be unwilling to license a particular use being complained of or to license a particular person or entity.521 In both types
of situations, courts may be at a loss to assess an appropriate
compensatory award.522

516. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008)); accord Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift,
Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2011).
517. Bray, supra note 476, at 1038.
518. Id. This conception of injunctive relief places it in a hierarchy under which injunctive
remedies are conditioned on and unavailable unless legal remedies are inadequate.
Rendleman, supra note 385, at 348.
519. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 552-53
(2016). Courts have sometimes said that the standard for issuing mandatory injunctions (that
is, ones that direct the wrongdoer to do something) is stricter than the standard for
prohibitory injunctions (that is, ones that direct the wrongdoer to stop doing something),
although it is not clear exactly how much higher the standard is. See, e.g., DOBBS & ROBERTS,
supra note 1, § 2.9(1).
520. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.06[B].
521. See, e.g., Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 87 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677-79 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (granting permanent injunction to musicians who suffered irreparable harm because
they were unwilling to license their music for product advertising).
522. When copyright owners sue states or state-related institutions for infringement,
injunctive relief may be the only available remedy. The Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence precludes awards of damages or infringer profits in cases involving states
or state-related institutions. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
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Although a number of commentators have endorsed damage-only
remedies for unlicensed derivative works,523 this would, if applied
across the board, undermine the copyright owner’s right to decide
whether, when, to whom, and on what terms to license rights for
derivatives in a particular market segment.524 The unlicensed derivative may unfairly compete with the author’s own derivative
work or one that the author would have licensed but for the
infringement; the unlicensed derivative may also be of inferior
quality to that which the author would have licensed; or it may
disrupt the author’s planned rollout of derivatives.525
In general, authors will be interested in licensing derivative
works, such as translations or motion picture versions of stories, but
what if the author does not want to license derivative works at all?
It is a tricky question whether a damages-only award is the right
solution to this kind of unlicensed derivative work problem. After
all, there would be no market harm to the author’s own or licensed
derivatives, and awarding the author a share of the infringer’s
profits might be an equitable outcome, both for the author and for
the public, who might benefit from the derivative work’s availability. Because U.S. copyright law does not generally protect the moral
rights of authors, but only their economic interests, harms to
authors’ reputational or dignitary interests caused by unlicensed
derivatives might seem irrelevant.
Courts have, however, sometimes opined that authors should not
be, in effect, forced to license derivatives. The Supreme Court in
Harper & Row stated that authors have a First Amendment right
not to speak, which was why the Court thought that President Ford
and his publisher should enjoy the right to control the first publication of excerpts from his memoirs.526 Along similar lines, the Second
Circuit opined in Colting that authors have a First Amendment
right not to be compelled to speak, which the court thought would
result if Salinger could not stop publication of Colting’s sequel to
523. See, e.g., Geller, supra note 508, at 187-89; Kozinski & Newman, supra note 508, at
525-26.
524. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s
Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1527-28 (2013); Dannay, supra note 271, at 45253.
525. Samuelson, supra note 524, at 1530-31.
526. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985).
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Catcher in the Rye.527 Although the Third Circuit in TD Bank
questioned the “compelled speech” dicta in Colting,528 that case was
distinguishable in that the bank was acting vindictively and the
infringing work’s author simply wanted to reuse parts of his prior
manuscript in a subsequent book.529
Some commentators have balked at proposals to award damages
as an alternative to injunctive relief for copyright infringement,
describing such proposals as creating “an ersatz species of compulsory licenses.”530 While some might say that only Congress can
authorize such licenses,531 eBay and its progeny have provided
courts with the opportunity to provide a damages alternative to
injunctive relief on a case-by-case basis instead of making acrossthe-board rules as congressionally adopted compulsory licenses
must do.532
Another objection to damages as an alternative to injunctive relief
has been a concern that damage awards would inadequately deter
infringement. It would seem to condone an “infringe now, pay later”
attitude.533 Professor Rendleman has observed that “[m]onetary
527. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (deferring to a copyright owner’s
decision not to license derivative works).
528. TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 281 n.11 (3d Cir. 2019).
529. See id. at 267.
530. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.06[B][1][b][iv]; see also Phillips, supra note
7, at 409 (referencing “forced judicial licensing”); Spillane, supra note 312, at 260. Yet,
numerous commentators have expressed support for liability over property rules in some
contexts. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View from the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). As applied to
IP remedies, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786 (2007); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between
the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2529-43 (1994).
531. See, e.g., H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final
Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1663-65 (2010)
(questioning whether courts have authority to grant future damage awards or continuing
royalties). The “Blurred Lines” case, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., is the only post-eBay
case that ordered payment of an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction. No. LA CV13-06004
(AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Williams v.
Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018); see supra text accompanying notes 333-39.
532. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111-12, 115-16, 118-19, 122 (2018).
533. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court
granted Woods’s motion for an injunction against public performance of the infringing movie,
even though the infringing scene was visible for only a few minutes. Id. However, no
injunction ultimately issued because the parties settled for monetary compensation after the
court asked Woods to draft an injunction. Phillips, supra note 7, at 433. In cases like Woods,
when the infringing element is a small part of a larger non-infringing product, enjoining the
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compensation tolerates the wrong and allows the perpetrator to buy
injustice.”534
Courts may sometimes be inclined to issue injunctions because
they realize that injunctive relief may induce the litigants to settle
their dispute; the prospect of that injunction may give plaintiffs
some leverage that the prospect of a damages-only remedy will
not.535 eBay may have had some effects on the willingness of
litigants to settle infringement disputes because plaintiffs have
somewhat less leverage now than they did in the pre-eBay period.
It is, however, impossible to measure the extent of that effect.
Another consideration that may explain why there are not more
damages-instead-of-injunction remedies in copyright cases may be
the reluctance of defendants to make the alternative argument out
of concern that it might undermine their chances of success with
other defenses: “Your honor, my client did not infringe because its
use of the plaintiff’s work was fair and non-infringing—but please,
your honor, if you disagree, only order it to pay this modest amount
as damages.” This may not seem like a winning strategy.
Yet, because fair use rulings are typically decided on summary
judgment, the argument-in-the-alternative consideration would
seem to have relatively little explanatory power. In the aftermath
of Campbell, moreover, courts have become much more receptive to
fair use defenses.536 As Judge Leval noted in his famous article,
courts may be inclined to rule in favor of fair use in close cases when
they think an injunction would disserve the overall purposes of
copyright law.537

whole work is likely “to drive settlement rates far above what would be socially optimal.” Id.
at 415.
534. Rendleman, supra note 385, at 352.
535. See, e.g., Dannay, supra note 271, at 459 (asserting that the threat of injunctive relief
is the “800-pound gorilla” in fair use cases). The Kennedy concurrence in eBay also expressed
concern about “undue leverage.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Other commentators are more sanguine about injunctions as
inducements to private settlements. Rendleman, supra note 385, at 352.
536. See, e.g., Asay et al., supra note 181 (empirical study showing significance of transformativeness tipping in favor of fair use defenses).
537. Leval, supra note 145, at 1131 & n.114. But see Gilden, supra note 318, at 1149-50
(expressing concern that courts will construe the scope of copyright more broadly if they think
it is unnecessary to issue injunctions because monetary compensation would remedy harm
to the plaintiff).

854

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:773

CONCLUSION
In the past decade, the eBay decision has had a considerable
impact on the issuance of injunctions in copyright cases. The
previously common view that any violation of an exclusive right
entitles copyright owners to injunctive relief because that violation,
like a trespass to land, constitutes irreparable harm cannot be
reconciled with eBay’s conception of exclusive rights and remedies
as “distinct” from one another.538
eBay has meant that copyright owners now bear a much stiffer
burden of proof when seeking injunctive relief. It is no longer
enough to show actual or likely success on the merits. The longstanding presumption of irreparable harm is no more, and plaintiffs who fail to offer meaningful proof of such harm are likely to be
denied this remedy. It is fair to say that eBay resurrected irreparable harm as a key factor in judicial decisions about whether to
exercise discretion to order this remedy for infringement. Even so,
Campbell’s endorsement of presuming irreparable harm in “simple
piracy” cases (that is, when the defendant has made exact or nearexact copies of the plaintiff’s work that is undercutting the market
for legitimate copies) should perhaps be revived as a reasonable
exception to eBay’s general rule against presumptions.
Courts are also more attentive now to hardships that injunctions
impose on defendants as a balancing factor. Defendants have more
opportunity to counter plaintiffs’ arguments about hardships. The
public interest, however, has so far played a lesser role in the posteBay cases, except in close or novel issue cases. Going forward,
courts should pay closer attention to the effects of injunctive relief
on public interests and consider harms that injunctions would cause
to innocent third parties as part of the public-interest factor rather
than in the hardship-balancing factor.
The burdens on judges are greater now also. They cannot just
invoke the old presumption of irreparable harm and ignore the
hardship-balancing and public-interest factors. They are required
to explain their reasoning as to each of the four factors and describe

538. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.
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how they have weighed factors together when some favor the
plaintiff and some the defendant.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell may have helped to
pave the way for the ruling in eBay. However, as this Article has
shown, Campbell’s note 10 had much less impact on court decisions
in the years leading up to the eBay decision than one might have
expected from one of the foundational cases in copyright jurisprudence. At the very least, eBay’s reliance on Campbell and other
copyright cases seemingly clarified the relevance of its holding on
requests for injunctive relief in copyright disputes.
Overall, eBay has had a positive effect on judicial consideration
of injunctive relief in copyright cases. Before eBay, courts almost
automatically issued injunctions when copyright owners had shown
that the defendants had likely or actually infringed their rights.
They too easily presumed from this finding that the infringement or
likely infringement had caused irreparable harm without considering a balancing of hardships or the public interest. Yet, eBay has
rarely hindered the issuance of injunctions in simple piracy cases.
This is as it should be.

